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1 Introduction
Due to the increase in the geographical mobility across the world, a growing number of
economists and policy makers is getting interested in the link between ethnic diversity and
social participation. Not only is social participation important per se, but it is also crucial
because it is likely to be correlated with a broad set of labor market outcomes including
productivity and wages. A recent article (Borghans, Weel, and Weinberg, 2008) shows that
indicators at age 16 of a non-cognitive skill like sociability1 are good predictors of people's
future performance in the labor market, thus claiming the need of studying the pattern of
sociability for adolescents. In this respect, Cunha and Heckman (2008) show that, while
parental investment for children's cognitive skills should take place between age 6 and age 9,
the sensible period for investing in non-cognitive skills occurs later in children's development
i.e. between age 8 and age 13.
In the last decade very in°uent papers have been written with the purpose of explaining
the impact of ethnic diversity on di®erent outcomes including social participation, but very
few attempts have been done to analyze the behavior of young people and to distinguish
di®erent forms of social participation. We believe that both extensions are potentially very
promising. On this respect, in our analysis of social participation, we distinguish between
`structured' and `unstructured' activities where the former require a more developed capac-
ity of planning ahead, while the latter are more spontaneous and they do not require any
planning. The reason why we think that such a distinction must be of interest for social scien-
tists and especially for economists is that, according to the well known theory of the big-¯ve
personality traits (see Goldberg, 1971), the preference for planned rather than spontaneous
behavior is one of the main features characterizing the trait of conscientiousness2 which has
been shown to be closely related with leadership, longevity, college grades (Borghans, Duck-
worth, and Heckman, 2008) and job performance (Borghans, Duckworth, and Heckman, 2008;
Salgado, 1997; Avis, Kudisch, and Fortunato, 2002; Fallon, Avis, Kudisch, Gornet, and A.,
2000).
Understanding the dynamics of social interaction has also direct policy implications in the
debate on community cohesion and it shape new strategies to pursue a better integration of
ethnic minorities. The importance of social participation in the process of integration of ethnic
minorities has its roots in Granovetter's concept of `weak ties' and `strong ties' (Granovetter,
1973) and the derived Putnam's idea of `bounding' and `bridging' social capital (Putnam,
2000), where the former type of capital indicates `ties to people who are like you in some
important way', while the latter de¯nes `ties to people who are unlike you in some important
way'. We believe that, while spontaneous aggregation is strongly driven by `bounding social
capital', forms of socialization where people share a common aim lead to the creation of
`bridging social capital' and they imply a higher level of interaction among di®erent ethnic
groups.3
1These indicators include `going to the cinema or disco', `going to youth clubs', `do community work', `go
to political clubs', `going out with friends without a particular reason'
2The remaining four factors are Openness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism
3On this respect, Putnam (2007) observes that in the USA `Community centers, athletic ¯elds, and schools
were among the most e±cacious instruments for incorporating new immigrants a century ago, and we need to3
We follow Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), in arguing that young people's social participa-
tion might be in°uenced by the ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which they live,
however, we focus on the case of England since very few pieces of work are available in the
economic literature for this country in spite of a growing interest among the policy makers.
In fact, it is generally thought that `the high levels of residential segregation found in many
English towns would make it di±cult to achieve community cohesion' (H.O., 2001) and that
there is little interaction between people with di®erent ethnic background, especially when
spontaneous socialization is taken into account (CIC, 2007).
The model we propose is based on the idea that more spontaneous and less spontaneous
forms of social participation di®er in two respects. On the one hand they are di®erent in
the level of importance the agents attach to the interaction with other people belonging to
the same ethnic group, on the other hand they take place at di®erent geographical levels. In
fact, while spontaneous social interaction is likely to occur in the neighborhood in which the
adolescents live, the majority of the structured social activities are located in a broader area
e.g. the district. Therefore, a changes in the ethnic composition of the area could lead to
changes in the rate of participation in social activities as well as a a shift from one type of
activity to the other.
We test our predictions by using di®erent data sources including the Longitudinal Study
of Young People in England (LSYPE): a large sample of young people at grade nine at school
which contains detailed information on the pattern of socialization of the respondents. In
particular, to the authors' best knowledge, LSYPE is the only survey which both permits
to distinguish between spontaneous and non spontaneous forms of social participation and
which contains some indication of the geographical level where the activities take place.
The empirical analysis con¯rms the predictions derived from our theoretical model and it
suggests that ethnic diversity, in all its di®erent aspects, has a strong impact on spontaneous
interaction, while it has a much weaker e®ect on more structured activities.
In the last part of the paper we carry out an instrumental variable analysis to correct for
attenuation bias and to address the problem of potential endogenous Tiebout type (Tiebout,
1956) sorting into areas. The results we got are even stronger than our previous ¯ndings.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature
both in sociology and in economics and it explains the location of our contribution in both
disciplines. In section 3 we set up a model in which agents have to choose among alternative
forms of social participation (including no participation at all). In section 4 we present the
empirical application and we provide the instrumental variable analysis. Section 5 concludes.
reinvest in such places and activities once again, enabling us all to become comfortable with diversity'4
2 Background
2.1 Ethnic minorities and social participation
The investigation of the causal link between ethnicity and social participation is relatively
new in economics, while in sociology the topic has been studied since the ¯rst half of the
twentieth century. However, most of this literature analyzes the case of the USA and it is
based on evidence showing that black Americans seem to participate more than their white
counterpart also when social status is controlled for. The contributions trying to explain
such a stylized fact refer to two competing theories. The ¯rst one, labeled as `compensation
hypothesis' and proposed by Myrdal, Steiner, and Rose (1944) argues that black people use
social participation as a mean of getting involved in social life when whites tend to exclude
them from it. The alternative theory: Olsen's (Olsen, 1966) `ethnic community hypothesis'
states that high participation among minorities is a consequence of their internal cultural
solidity and of their ethnic community consciousness.
The results provided for the USA in most of the literature seem to be robust when blacks
and whites are compared. However, allowing for di®erent ethnic groups within these broad
categories and for di®erent forms of participation raises some additional problems. Antunes
and Gaitz (1975) argue that, while black people show a greater willingness to participate, the
level of social participation among Mexican Americans seem to be lower than the one among
whites. Moreover, they suggest that the di®erent forms of participation should be divided
into `public' and `private' in order to distinguish activities involving large-scale interaction
from those taking place in small aggregations such as family or peer groups. An alternative
distinction between di®erent forms of social participation can be found in Putnam (Putnam,
2000) where social activities are divided into `formal' and `informal', the former include church
attendance, volunteering, and everything related to community based project and political
life, the latter, far more frequent, are `less purposeful', `less organized' `more spontaneous and
more °exible' forms of interaction like getting together for a drink, a dinner or a barbecue,
gossiping with neighbors, watching TV with friends and so on.
Our paper is in line with Putnam (2000) and Antunes and Gaitz (1975) in allowing social
participation to take di®erent forms. In particular, we argue that the ethnic composition of
the neighborhood where the young people live has di®erential e®ects on spontaneous partic-
ipation and on a more conventional form of interaction in which people share a speci¯c aim,
as stated by Putnam (2007).
While the link between ethnicity and participation has been studied for long time for the
USA, very few papers address the topic for England. However, these pieces of work have in
general the advantage of trying to study di®erent forms of participation separately. Platt
(2007) analyzes the relationship between illness, caring and ethnicity on social participation
and she ¯nds that di®erent ethnic groups are characterized by diverse patterns of socialization,
but the di®erent types of social interaction (e.g organized activities and simple going out)
turn out to be complements. Finally, using BHPS data, Li (2006) studies whether ethnicity
(among other variables) determines social capital. Once again, the results show that the
conclusions that can be drawn vary both across models di®ering for the type of participation5
analyzed and across di®erent ethnic groups.
2.2 Measures and e®ects of ethnic diversity
A very interesting literature in economics focuses on the impact of ethnic diversity on several
outcomes.4 The de¯nition of ethnic diversity is an umbrella term encompassing at least
two di®erent (although related) aspects and it has been measured through a set of di®erent
indicators.
The ¯rst aspect regards the degree of heterogeneity characterizing an area.5 Ottaviano
and Peri (2006) de¯ne `culturally diverse cities' those having a larger share of foreign born
people and they ¯nd that USA born citizens living in such areas pay higher rents than those
living in more homogeneous ones. In a companion paper (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005) the same
two authors measure cultural diversity by using an index constructed on the basis of the main
language spoken at home and they conclude that wages for whites in diverse cities are higher
than elsewhere. A tool which has been widely used in the literature in order to describe
ethnic diversity is a decreasing transformation of the Her¯ndhal concentration index which
can be interpreted as the probability that two individuals, randomly drawn from the entire
population, belong to the same ethnic group. The starting point for the economic literature
using such an index can be considered the article by Easterly and Levine (1997), in which the
authors found that ethnic heterogeneity a®ects negatively many economic outcomes at the
macro level. The same results are achieved by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and
Wacziarg (2003) by using both a fractionalization index computed by distinguishing groups
on the basis of the language they speak and and a version of the same index distinguishing
within language groups on the basis of certain physical characteristics.
A second aspect describing ethnic composition is ethnic segregation, measuring the de-
gree of separation between di®erent groups.6 The de¯nition of ethnic segregation has been
used in many di®erent formulations. For example Borjas (1998) de¯nes `ethnic segregated
ghettos' those areas where `the population that belongs to the respondent ethnic group is at
least as large as would have been expected if the ethnic group was randomly allocated to the
neighborhood'. Borjas' paper ¯nds that ethnic spill-overs are signi¯cant for young people.
Although there is no agreement on an index which best measures segregation, the literature
has mainly used the Duncan and Duncan dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955).7
Using the Duncan and Duncan index,8 Cutler and Gleaser (1997) show that spatial segrega-
tion of di®erent ethnic groups has an e®ect on on schooling, employment and the probability
to become single mother and it harms Blacks more than Whites.9 The Duncan and Duncan
4A thorough review is Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
5The words `heterogeneity', `fragmentation' and `fractionalization' has been used by the literature to de¯ne
the same phenomenon i.e. the degree of (ethnic) homogeneity.
6A third concept could be the idea of `ethnic polarization' which is discussed in Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2002). Although interesting, such a concept does not enter our model and it will not presented in
details.
7Other widely used indices are the square root index of segregation introduced by Hutchens (Hutchens,
2001, 2004) and the index of isolation (Bell, 1954). For a discussion on the properties of some indices of
segregation see also Jenkins, Micklewright, and Schnepf (2006)
8Together with the exposure index
9A similar result is achieved by Echenique and Roland (2007) by using a new index called the `spectral
segregation index' (SSI).6
index is the indicator we will use to describe ethnic segregation in the reminder of our paper.
To the authors' knowledge, very few papers test the e®ects of fractionalization and segre-
gation together. Gleaser, Schelnkman, and Shleifer (1995) study the e®ect of ethnic diversity
on population growth for a cross-section of American cities and they ¯nd no e®ect of fraction-
alization but a positive e®ect of segregation for cities having large non whites communities. A
paper explicitly claiming the need of using both measures is La Ferrara and Mele (2007). The
authors analyze the link between ethnic diversity and public school expenditure and focus on
the e®ects of changes in segregation for a given level of fractionalization. The authors ¯nd
that segregation has a positive impact on average public school expenditure both at the MSA
level and at the district level.10 However, segregation leads to a more unequal distribution
of spending among districts belonging to the same metropolitan area.
2.3 Ethnic diversity and social participation
Very few papers study explicitly the relationship between ethnic diversity and social par-
ticipation by stressing the importance of the ethnic composition of the neighborhood. A
very interesting piece of work in this area, both for the topic addressed and for the method-
ology adopted, is Alesina and La Ferrara (2000). In their paper, the authors explore the
socio-economic determinants of social participation in a set of social activities (ranging from
professional associations to church groups or literary clubs) by focusing on the role played
by ethnic fractionalization.11 By observing that preferences are likely to be determined by
ethnicity and economic status and after testing their hypothesis by using USA data from the
General Social Survey for the years 1974-1994, the authors conclude that there might be a
link between ethnic fractionalization and social participation.
A recent paper addressing the topic for the UK is Letki (2008), which uses the Citizen Sur-
vey and Census data to study how racial fractionalization a®ects the degree of social capital.
The author argues that the results supporting the hypothesis that ethnic fractionalization
has an important impact on social capital might be driven by an omitted variable problem.
In fact, after controlling for an index of Multiple Deprivation at the ward level, the impact of
ethnic diversity seemed to be barely insigni¯cant.12 We think that this lack of results might
be due to the choice of aggregating all the types of activities into a single group.
10MSA is the acronym indicating metropolitan areas in the USA, districts are a lower level aggregation and
they are nested into MSA
11In this paper and in the one presented in the following paragraph ethnic fractionalization is measured by
using the transformation of the Her¯ndhal concentration index we have introduced in the previous section
12However, as argued by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), ethnic fractionalization can also have an e®ect on
social participation through deprivation. In fact, racial or ethnic fractionalization can also be the cause of
poor investment in physical infrastructures and so be positively correlated with deprivation, As a consequence,
controlling for those variables can also lead to underestimation of the impact of ethnic fractionalization.7
2.4 Our contribution
This paper makes several contributions.
The ¯rst one is the attempt of studying the e®ects of ethnic diversity on people's behavior
by explicitly distinguishing between di®erent forms of social participation. In doing so, we try
to ¯nd a contact point between the sociological literature aiming at classifying di®erent social
activities and the papers which, especially in economics, analyze the impact of ethnic diversity
on various socio-economic outcomes. For our classi¯cation, we borrow Putnam's (Putnam,
2000) distinction between `formal' and `informal' activities, but we move the demarcation
line in order to take into account the di®erent geographical level where the two groups of
activities take place. In particular, we stress the idea that activities can be divided into
`structured' and `less structured', where the former are, in Putnam's terminology, `more
purposeful' in the sense that people do not meet only for the sake of staying together, but they
get together because they share a common aim. As a consequence, we consider `structured'
a very broad range of activities ranging from Putnam's (Putnam, 2000) forms of `civic and
political participation' to less formal groups of actions like playing sport or going to the
cinema. We argue that all these di®erent activities share the characteristics of not being
completely casual, since they must be planned in advance, perhaps discussing timing and
methods with friends or peers. The opposite of such structured forms of socialization is the
most casual interaction, i.e. the simple `hanging around' with friends, which, in the case of
the teenagers we are interested in, is a very important and common way of creating social
ties. In particular, we argue that `unstructured' social participation is likely to take place
in the neighborhood where the kids live, while more structured activities have a broader
geographical scope.
Explicitly modeling young people's choice within a geographical hierarchy is the second
contribution of our paper. We focus on two levels of the English geography: the ward and
the districts which is the level of aggregation into which wards are nested.13 The reason
why we use wards as our lower level is that, according to the O±ce for National Statistics,
the ward is the `key building block of the English administrative geography', wards are
used for the election of local government councillors and they can enjoy a certain degree
of autonomy. The higher level of aggregation we use is based on the the local authority
districts. The local authority districts constitute the most important geographical unit both
because they enjoy greater administrative autonomy than the wards and because, since the
`Local Government Reorganisation' which took place in the 90s, the districts are in charge
of providing many important services, previously supplied by the counties. In particular, the
districts are responsible for the cultural and recreational functions, which is why we assume
that structured social activities take place at that upper level of aggregation.
The third contribution is intimately related to the ¯rst two and it derives from the idea
that alternative concepts describing the ethnic composition of a given area (namely `ethnic
fractionalization' and `ethnic segregation') measure two di®erent aspects of ethnic diversity.
In our explanation we follow La Ferrara and Mele (2007) in stressing the importance of con-
sidering a geographic hierarchy organized on di®erent levels of aggregation and we model
13For a more detailed description of the English geographical hierarchy, see the data appendix8
explicitly the relationship between segregation and fractionalization and its e®ects on al-
ternative forms of social participation. In particular, we argue that, in order to explain
participation in more structured activities, a probabilistic concept as measured by the index
of fractionalization might not be enough to explain the forces driving social interaction and
the possibility of searching within the districts must be taken into account.
Moreover, our paper focuses on social participation for teenagers which has hardly been
analyzed in the literature, in spite of being of crucial importance for the future of the society
(see Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Furthermore, young people are more likely to choose
activities just maximizing their own utility with no sons, no old parents, no spouses involved
in the decision. Finally, neighborhood e®ects seem to play an important role in shaping
young people's preferences as stated by Case and Katz (1991), who claim that interaction
with peers strongly shape young people's behaviors.
The last contribution is an attempt to solve the problem of potential endogenous sorting
into districts ant it suggests an historically driven IV strategy to identify the causal e®ect of
ethnic diversity on social participation.9
3 The model
The model developed in this section explains how fractionalization and segregation14 in°uence
social interaction. In our model, which is inspired by Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) one, social
interaction is in°uenced by two di®erent characteristics of the agents: their ethnicity and their
geographical location.
We consider two di®erent geographical units: the ward, in which most of the unstructured
social interaction takes places, and the district. We chose the district as our higher level of
aggregation, since we think that the young people rarely create social ties out of it. Further-
more, our choice of allowing structured forms of participation to take place at the district
level is particularly meaningful in the case of England where the cultural and recreational
functions are now under the responsibility of the Local Authorities.
Since `homophily' is a broadly observed phenomenon in the adolescent networks (see for
example Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2007; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2000), we
assume that young people derive more utility matching with people similar to them, moreover,
we allow the players to be characterized by di®erent levels of `tolerance' toward di®erent ethnic
groups. The choice is modeled as a simultaneous game whose payo®s are a function of the
share of people of the same ethnicity who choose the same activity. Therefore, all the payo®s
will be strictly greater than zero and smaller or equal to one. The model explains why and
in which cases equilibria characterized by a certain level of integration can arise.
3.1 Two actions and one parameter of tolerance
Let us consider a country composed by wards aggregated into districts. Let us assume for
simplicity that there is just one district divided in two wards. In any ward two ethnic groups
live: British (b) and non British (n). Therefore, the population can be divided in 4 groups:
British who live in ward 1 (b1), British who live in ward two (b2), non British who live in ward
1 (n1) and non British who live in ward two (n2). Each group has to decide simultaneously
whether to be involved in a social activity (SA), which takes place within the district or to
choose a less structured form of social interaction i.e. to `hang around' (HA) in the ward.
People derive more utility from social interactions with people of the same ethnicity (b or
n) and each type has its own level of `tolerance' towards ethnicity, °gi, which is a parameter
between 0 and 1, where °gi =1 identi¯es people who do not care about ethnicity. We assume
that all the individuals of the same type choose the same action. In fact, the unit under
analysis (the ward) is little and we believe that peer pressure and social in°uence are very
strong when we analyze small groups of young people.
The young people are characterized by a group speci¯c15 utility function with the usual




14We adopt the de¯nition of segregation measured by the Duncan and Duncan index










where A = SA;HA, i = 1;2 and g= b, n.
From now on, we will consider a speci¯c utility function, which has the stated properties:
Ug1(SA) =
g1(SA) + g2(SA) + °g1((¡g1(SA)) + (¡g2(SA)))
g1(SA) + g2(SA) + (¡g1(SA)) + (¡g2(SA))
(5)









where gi(A) is the number of people belonging to group g who live in ward i and who
choose the action A.
The ¯rst model we propose is a simultaneous game with four players and two actions
where people maximize the utility functions presented in the equations (5)-(8)
There are 16 candidates to be a equilibrium in pure strategies, but just 4 of them can
actually exist.
These are:
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;SA;HA;SA) (9)
in which all the British `hang around' and all the other are involved in social activities, and
the opposite case
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;HA;SA;HA) (10)
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;SA;SA;HA) (11)
and
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;HA;HA;SA) (12)
Equilibria (9) and (10) are equilibria with perfect segregation, while (11) and (12) are
equilibria with partial integration
Equilibria with perfect segregation. Candidates (9) and (10) are equilibria with perfect
segregation for each distribution of the ethnic groups within the district. In this type of11
equilibria each ethnicity (in both wards) chooses the same activity, so there is no social
interaction between British and not British and everyone achieves the maximum possible
utility. Equilibria with perfect segregation take place even when the two ethnic groups cohabit
in the same ward, this means that equilibria with perfect segregation could arise also in the
absence of perfect geographical segregation.
Equilibria with partial integration. Candidates (11) and (12) are equilibria with partial
integration for particular sizes of the sub populations b1, b2, n1, n2 (see Appendix 1).
In equilibria (11) and (12), even if the utility level two of the players16 achieve is smaller
than one, they have no incentive to deviate. This implies that there are some distributions
of the population (with some degrees of segregation) which permit equilibria in which people
of di®erent ethnic groups ¯nd it optimal to interact. Apart from (9)-(12), we can easily rule
out other types of equilibria, since there is not a composition of the population that supports
them. The detailed description is presented in Appendix 1.
Proposition 1. (9)-(12) are all equilibria if b1 = b2 and n1 = n2.
Proof. Recall that candidates (9)-(10) are equilibria for each distribution on the population.
Equilibrium (11) exists if SA is the best reply both for n1 and for b2, since b1 and n2
already achieve the maximum possible pay-o®. This means that two conditions have to be
met.
Un1(SA) ¸ Un1(HA) (13)
Ub2(SA) ¸ Ub2(HA) (14)







which means b1 ¸ b2







which means n2 ¸ n1.
Similarly (12) exists if SA is the best reply both for b1 and n2, since b2 and n1 already
achieve the maximum possible pay-o®. It means that two conditions have to be met.
Ub1(SA) ¸ Ub1(HA) (17)
Un2(SA) ¸ Un2(HA) (18)
16Players of type b2 and n1 in 11 and of type b1 and n2 in 1212














which means b2 ¸ b1.
Therefore, in order to have both equilibrium (11) and equilibrium (12), we need b1 = b2
and n1 = n2.
Proposition 2. The game has only 2 equilibria if b1 < b2 and n1 < n2 or if b1 > b2 and
n1 > n2
Proof. In both cases neither conditions of equilibrium (11) nor condition of equilibrium (12)
are met.
Proposition 3. For a given level of fractionalization, an increase of segregation does not
decrease the number of people who play HA.
Proof. It is easy to prove that an increase of the level of segregation that does not change
the number of possible equilibria, increases the number of people who hang around.
Let us now consider an increase of the level of segregation changing the number of possible
equilibria. It can be proved that the equilibrium with partial integration and high hanging
around is more robust than the equilibrium with partial integration and less hanging around
to changes in the number of possible equilibria due to an increase in segregation.
Framework 1 Let us ¯rst consider the case in which n1 = n2 and b1 = b2.
case 1 let us suppose some of the non British in ward 2 move to ward 1, i.e. b1 = b2
and n1 > n2. The ethnic fractionalization of the district is una®ected, but the two ethnic
groups are distributed in a di®erent way within it. In fact, this change increases the level of
segregation, which was zero in the previous case.
In this new situation (b1 = b2 and n1 > n2), the conditions for the existence of equilibrium
(12) are not met and just equilibrium (11) survives.
In equilibrium (11) the number of people who hang around (n1 + b2) is greater than the
number of people who are involved in social activities (n2 + b1), since n1 ¸ n2 and b1 = b2.13
case 2 Assume now some of the non British in ward 1 move to ward 2, i.e b1 = b2 and
n1 < n2.
In this case the conditions for existence of equilibrium (11) are not met and just equilib-
rium (12) survives.
In equilibrium (12) the number of people who hang around (n2 + b1) is greater than the
number of people who are involved in social activities, since n1 < n2
The previous cases show that, starting from the 4 equilibria case, an increase in segregation
makes the equilibrium where fewer people hang around unfeasible and it does not a®ect the
other equilibrium of partial integration, in which more people hang around.
case 3 Let us assume now that both some of the non British and some of the British in
ward 1 move to ward 2, but let us also assume also the two changes are di®erent in size
(therefore we can keep a positive level of segregation) i.e b1 · b2 and n1 · n2.
In this case neither the conditions of equilibrium (11) nor the conditions of equilibrium
(12) are met, and we are left only with the equilibria of perfect segregation.
Framework 2 Let us now consider the case in which we have 3 equilibria: the 2 equilibria
with perfect segregation and the equilibrium of partial integration in which more people hang
around
case 1 Reaching a point where there are 4 equilibria by increasing the level of segregation
is impossible, since in the four equilibria case segregation is always zero.
case 2 The only way to make the equilibrium with partial integration and high hanging
around unfeasible is decreasing the level of segregation
Framework 3 Finally, let us now consider the case with just the equilibria with perfect
segregation: an increase of segregation changing the number of possible equilibria, makes the
equilibrium with high hanging around feasible and it does not a®ect the equilibrium with low
hanging around
We can easily prove that the same is true in the following cases.
n1 = n2 and b1 ¸ b2, n1 · n2 and b1 ¸ b2 when equilibrium (11) exists, n1 = n2 and
b1 · b2, n1 · n2 and b1 ¸ b2, n1 ¸ n2 and b1 · b2, b1 · b2 and n1 ¸ n2 when equilibrium
(12) exists.14
3.2 Two actions and two parameters of tolerance
Now we modify the environment described before by introducing two di®erent parameters
of `tolerance', ¯gi and °gi. We can assume that tolerance is higher when we consider social
activities, since the interest in the activity itself can compensate part of the disutility created
by the interaction with people of a di®erent ethnic group. In order to have °gi ¸ ¯gi for all
°gi and 0 · ¯gi · 1, we can ¯x °gi =
p
¯gi
17. Parameter °gi is type speci¯c and it is known
by the other players.
Thus, we still have the same simultaneous game as before, but the utility functions for













The utility function depends on the percentage of people of the same ethnic group who
choose the same activity. The introduction of two di®erent parameters of tolerance helps us
studying not only the e®ect of a change in the geographical collocation of di®erent ethnic
groups within the districts, but also the e®ect of changes in the ethnic mixture of the districts
itself. In fact, Since °gi ¸ ¯gi, a change in the composition of the population a®ects the two
activities in di®erent ways. The following proposition explains this mechanism.
Proposition 4. A change in district's fractionalization that does not change the level of
segregation in the district has a greater e®ect on HA than on SA.
Proof. Let us assume that British people (bi) are the majority. Consider ¯rst the e®ect of
participation in social activities chosen by British people due to a change in the share of non
British people, which means a change in ethnic fractionalization. The utility to be considered
is
Ubi(SA) = Sb(SA) + °bSn(SA) (24)
Where Sbi(SA) and Sni(SA) are the shares of British and non British who play SA. If
we express (24) in terms of the share of the Non British who are involved in that activity, it
becomes:
Ubi(SA) = 1 ¡ Sn(SA) + °bSn(SA) (25)
17The results of the model hold for all °gi ¸ ¯gi15
so the change in the utility due to a change in the composition of the population18 is
@Ubi(SA)
@Sn
= ¡1 + °bi · 0 (26)
However, the increase of non British has an e®ect also on the other activity which is
@Ubi(HA)
@Sn
= ¡1 + ¯bi · 0 (27)
since °bi ¸ ¯bi, ¡1 + °bi ¸ ¡1 + ¯bi, so the utility of SA decreases less than the utility of
HA.
The opposite is true, once we consider the choice of non British people.
@Uni(SA)
@Sn
= 1 ¡ °ni ¸ 0 (28)
@Uni(HA)
@Sn
= 1 ¡ ¯ni ¸ 0 (29)
since °ni ¸ ¯ni, 1¡°ni · +1¡¯ni, i.e. the utility of SA increases less than the utility of
HA.
And it is true in both wards i.
However, since b is the majority, at the aggregate level, the ¯rst e®ect prevails on the
second, thus the net e®ect of a change in the ethnic composition on both activities is negative
and it is greater in absolute value for spontaneous forms of social interaction.
The feasible equilibria are still the four we have already described, but the introduction of
two di®erent parameters of tolerance relaxes the conditions for the existence of the equilibria
with partial integration. In general we can say that the higher is the level of tolerance °gi,
the more likely are the equilibria of partial integration. The following examples explain how
equilibria depend on the parameter of tolerance.
Let us suppose that all the agents know the exact value of parameter °gi, so they can use
this information in order to make their choices.
Example 1. consider the case in which b1 = b2 and n1 > n2. We have the two equilibria with
perfect segregation and equilibrium (12) 8 °, as in the case studied in the previous paragraph
Furthermore, we have also equilibrium (11) for some values of °. Since in this case players
b1 and n2 already obtain utility equal to one, we just have to check the conditions for the
other players. Thus, in order to have equilibrium (11), we need the following conditions to
be met.




b1(HA)+n1(HA) which is always true since
°gi ¸ ¯gi and b1 = b2









· °b2 · 1 (30)
18Let us assume, without loss of generality that an increase of non British takes place16
The value b2n1¡b2n2
n1(b2+n2) is admissible, because it is greater than 0 since n1 ¸ n2
There are still some individuals with high °b2, who decide to play SA.
3.3 Three actions and three parameters of tolerance
In this paragraph we introduce a third action: staying at home (N). The key assumption of
this section is that the utility derived from staying at home is strictly lower than one, i.e. for
the ones who decide to stay at home it is impossible to reach the maximum level of utility.
This captures the idea that socializing increases people's utility. In this new speci¯cation
of the model the number of possible equilibria increases considerably (81, 3 strategies for 4
players). In addition to equilibria (9)-(12), just 4 other equilibria are possible.
These are the following:
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;N;SA;HA) (31)
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;SA;N;HA) (32)
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (N;HA;HA;SA) (33)
(b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;HA;HA;N) (34)
Each player chooses to stay at home if her reservation utility (U) is greater than the
utility achieved when she is involved in another activity (HA or SA).
The example 1, described in the previous paragraph, is modi¯ed as follows:
Example 2. we have the 2 equilibria with perfect segregation and equilibrium (11) with partial
integration if Un2 ·
n2+°n2b1
n2+b1 and Ub1 ·
b1+°b1n2
n2+b1
The equilibria in which one group plays N exist when the utility of staying at home is


















It comes without saying that equilibrium (12) and equilibria (33)-(34) are mutually exclu-
sive (if we disregard the case in which U is exactly equal to the threshold)
19It is because ° is always greater or equal ¯ and because b1 = b217
Proposition 5. Among the young people involved in a social activity, the ones belonging to
a minority are more tolerant.
Proof. We will prove this proposition in the case of two ethnicities, when the reservation
utilities of the di®erent ethnic groups are the same, so that a di®erent level of participation
is not the consequence of a di®erent value of the outside option.
Let us consider the case in which all the players derive the same utility from staying at
home, Ub1 = Un1 = Ub2 = Un2.
Let us now consider the case in which both b1 and n2 want to play SA, therefore equi-
librium (12) arises20 and conditions (37)-(38) hold.
Let us de¯ne now Sb1= b1
b1+n2 and Sn2= n2
b1+n2, conditions (37)-(38) become:
B1 plays SA if
Ub1 · Sb1 + °b1Sn2 (39)
which means
Ub1 · 1 ¡ Sn2 + °b1Sn2 (40)
Ub1 · 1 + (¡1 + °b1)Sn2 (41)
or





Ub1 ¡ 1 ¡ Sn2
Sn2
(43)
and if we consider n2
Ub1 · Sn2 + °n2Sb1 (44)





So °b1 · °n2 if Sn2 · 1
2
It means that, when n2 is the minority (Sn2 · 1
2) they will decide to be involved in a
social activity just if their level of tolerance is very high. This result is similar to the result
found by Alesina and La Ferrara (2000). Note that in this case the ones who stay at home
20We can easily prove that the same is true if (12) arises18
are not the ones belonging to the minority in their ward, but the ones who does not have a
valid outside option in the district.21
3.4 Testable predictions
Our model contains in nuce some predictions which can be easily tested in the data.
Testable prediction 1 (based on proposition 3): controlling for fractionalization, the
coe±cient indicating the e®ect of segregation on HA should be non negative.
Testable prediction 2 (based on proposition 4): controlling for segregation, a change in
fractionalization a®ects more HA than SA.
Testable prediction 3 (based on proposition 5): minorities will participate less when the
option `stay at home' is taken into account. This means than we should get more negative
coe±cients for the dummy variables indicating ethnic minorities when we include in the model
also people who do not take part in any social activity.
Moreover, data on social participation for young people can also shed light on one of the
crucial assumptions of our theoretical framework i.e. the complementarity between structured
activities and the simple hanging around near home.
21The implication is the following: if I am a minority and I live in a ward in which I am the majority, I can
still decide to stay at home if I can not ¯nd people of my type in the district19
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
The main data we use come from the ¯rst wave of the `Longitudinal Study of Young Peo-
ple in England' (LSYPE), a new dataset created by the `Department for Children, Schools
and Families'(DCSF) which contains detailed information for around 15000 pupils living in
England. Data were collected between 30 March and 19 October 2004 and refer to young
people in year 9 at school who were born between 1 September 1989 and 31 August 1990.
The dataset is composed of di®erent ¯les, each derived from a separate section of the ques-
tionnaire. Apart from the `young person section', where the questions are asked directly to
the child, there is a `household section', a `main parent section', a `young person history
section' and an `individual parent section'. Moreover, the dataset is useful for our research
since ethnic minorities have been over-sampled, which implies that it is possible to derive
separate results for relatively small ethnic groups.
In addition, a great advantage of the survey is that it is possible to link each respondent
to the `Lower Super Output Areas' (LSOA) in which she lives, which permit to construct
the whole geographical hierarchy aggregating LSOA into wards, wards into districts, districts
into counties.22 Given such a rich structure, it is also potentially possible to link any measure
computed at area level. In order to construct our indices of ethnic composition, we used data
from the 2001 Population Census. The reason for our choice is that census data permit a
high level of disaggregation (we used data at ward level) and they are representative of the
population, whereas survey data can su®er from bias due to sampling design and di®erential
non-response errors.23
Census data report the raw number of people living in each ward classi¯ed by ethnic group.
The ¯nest ethnic categorization available in the 2001 census distinguishes among: British,
Irish, other whites, mixed white and black Caribbeans, mixed white and black Africans,
mixed white and Asians, other mixed, Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, other Asians, Black
Caribbeans, Black Africans, Other Blacks, Chinese, Others.24 There is no agreement on how
to aggregate these categories into coarser groups. In particular, it is not clear how `mixed
people' should be classi¯ed. On the one hand, one might want to classify, for example,
individuals who have a black African parent and a white one in the black African group,
but on the other hand it is tempting to group all the `mixed' together in the same broad
category. The latter choice emphasizes the degree of assimilation into the British society, but
it adds together people having completely di®erent backgrounds. When the researchers are
interested in cultural speci¯c variables, creating the category of `mixed' can hide important
di®erences. For this reason we chose not to create the `mixed category' and we added data
for mixed people to the closest ethnic minority group.25
22In order to aggregate census data at ward level, we used the Neighbourhood Statistics provided by the
`O±ce for National Statistics'
23In principle, we could have used bootstrap techniques applied to LSYPE data as suggested in Jenkins,
Micklewright, and Schnepf (2006), but the small sample size for most of the districts would not have permitted
us to get reliable estimates.
24It is self reported ethnicity
25As a consequence `mixed white and black Caribbean' are considered `Caribbean' and so on20
4.2 Variables involved and descriptive statistics
Summary statistics of the variables we used in our empirical analysis can be found in table
1.
Social participation In order to derive information on social participation, we use a couple
of questions in the LSYPE youth questionnaire asking whether, in the four weeks before the
interview, the respondent has done any of the activities presented in a list.26 We chose some
of the activities presented and we divided them into several groups.
The theoretical framework we have presented earlier in the paper urges us to distinguish
between the simple not very purposeful `hanging around' and a richer set of social activities
implying a certain degree of planning. In order to construct the variable describing the ¯rst
type of interaction, we use the entry in the list referring to the simple hang around near the
respondent's home. Such an entry is really important for our purposes, since it explicitly
mentions the geographical level of aggregation in which the activities take place, as stated in
our theoretical model. In order to fully exploit this characteristics of our data, we decided
not to use the last entry in the list, i.e. the one referring to the hanging around in the high
street or in the town/city center. In fact, we think that such a form of social interaction
might share some of the characteristics we described for more structured forms of social
participation, since it implies making a move from a place to another.
Among the other social activities, we distinguish between forms of civic and political
participation (i.e. going to political meetings or demonstrations, doing community work or
going to youth clubs) and other forms of participation which we label `sports and amusements'
including: playing snooker, darts or pool, taking part in sports, going to see a football match
or other sport event, going to a party, dance nightclub or disco, going to cinema, theater or
concert. Although this second distinction is not used in our theoretical model, we decided
to keep the traditional demarcation line between more community oriented activities and
more self oriented ones as suggested by both Putnam (2000) and Antunes and Gaitz (1975)
classi¯cation. In that, this paper adds also new pieces of evidence to the literature on the
determinants of civic participation for ethnic minorities.
One might have noticed that `hanging around with friends in the high street', `going to
a pub', `going to an amusement arcade' and `playing an instrument' do not belong to any
group. The reason for the ¯rst exclusion has been already explained above and it relates
to the need of testing our hypothesis on the geographical scope of di®erent activities. We
excluded playing an instrument because even those playing in a band are likely to spend a
lot of time practicing alone, which can hardly be considered a social activity. For a similar
reason we also excluded `going to an amusement arcade', since it does not necessarily imply
any form of interaction with peers. Finally, we excluded `going to a pub' both because it lies
between structured and unstructured forms of participation and because of the age of our
sample. In fact, being the LSYPE respondents at this stage all younger than 18 years, the
proportion of those going to a pub is likely to be a very selected sub sample of people who
26The exact list, as well as the question wording is reported in the appendix 2. Notice that the respondents
can choose more than one activity.21
probably engage in illegal activities, given that drinking alcohol is not allowed by the law for
the class of people we are considering.
We can notice from table 2 that, although the participation rate is on average very high,
it varies considerably across activities: almost half of those interviewed went to the cinema,
more than 50 per cent of them took part in a sport activity, while less than 2 per cent took
part in a political demonstration. In addition, a big percentage of young people just hang
around both near home (around 55 per cent) and in the city center (around 30 per cent). It is
interesting to notice that the percentage of respondents who hang around near home is much
higher that the percentage of those going to the city center. This is not surprising, given the
age of the individuals interviewed and it con¯rms our hypothesis that most of the spontaneous
socialization takes place in the ward rather than in the district. Moreover, hanging around
with friends seems to be the most common social activity, showing that failing to study such
a form of socialization like most of the literature does, at least for the sub sample we consider,
would hide an important aspect of people's social life. Active political participation is not an
option many respondents choose (perhaps just because they are still too young), but, once
we adopt a broader de¯nition of politics and we consider all the activities implying a high
level of civic engagement, such as being involved in community works or being enrolled in a
youth club, participation in civic activities seems to be quite important.
Neighborhood level variables Among the explanatory variables, the ones we are mainly
interested in are fractionalization and segregation. In order to measure fractionalization, we
used the commonly used transformation of the Her¯ndahl concentration index according to
the formula:





Where Fj is the fractionalization index for the district j, while skj is the share of ethnic
group k in the total population of the district. Like the other indices, this index of fraction-
alization ranges from 0 to 1, with a value close to zero indicating a low level of heterogeneity
within the community and values close to 1 indicating extreme fractionalization. Table 3
reports the least and the most fragmented districts in England, showing that London is the
city in which most of the not British people reside, while in the north the percentage of
British is close to 100% and the fractionalization index is just above 0.002.














Where nbij and bij are the numbers of non British and British people in the ward level
i=1,.., Wi , NBj and Bj are the numbers of non British people and British people in the
district level and W is the number of wards in the district. Segregation is a more complex
concept than fractionalization ad it necessarily implies a comparison between a lower and an22
upper level (in our case the ward and the district). The indices of segregation compare the
level of ethnic homogeneity characterizing each ward with the level of homogeneity charac-
terizing the district, as a consequence, a high value of the index indicates a district where
people are clustered at ward level. The Duncan and Duncan index has been widely used sice
it has an easy and useful interpretation, given that it can be interpreted as a `share of people
belonging to one of the groups that should move to another ward (without being replaced) in
order to make the proportions between groups at ward level equal to the ones at the district
level'.
Table 3 shows that as in the case of fractionalization, segregated districts are not equally
distributed across England, since the northern-western areas are the most segregated, while
in the south east residential separation between ethnic groups is not an issue. The choice of
computing both indices at district level is in line with our theoretical model, since we think
it re°ects the distances that the young people might travel in order to take part in social
activities
In graphs 1, 2 and 3 we plotted the relationship between ethnic diversity and social
participation, considering the two di®erent indices and the three groups of activity. Without
conditioning on other variables, it is impossible to distinguish the sign of the correlation
between the segregation index and the di®erent types of social involvement. On the contrary,
in line with proposition 4 of our theoretical model, we can observe an inverse relationship
between ethnic fractionalization and spontaneous participation.
It is possible, of course, that the indices presented above might capture some of the
heterogeneity among districts which is not necessarily due to di®erences in their ethnic com-
position. In order to control for a set of characteristics of the neighborhood which could be
correlated with both our measures of ethnic composition, we used the IDACI27 index of Mul-
tiple Deprivation, we took from the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) for 200428
and we merged it into the main data. We chose the IDACI index since we are interested in
the multiple deprivation for children. The IDACI index is available at Super Output Area
which is even smaller than the ward. However, district level indices of deprivation can be
computed by taking a weighted average of the values computed for each LSOA.29
Individual level and family levels controls At the individual level we have obviously
controlled for ethnicity, which helps us shed light on the patterns of social participation for
di®erent ethnic groups which has has been largely studied by sociologists throughout the last
three decades. Due to the big sample size achieved, together with the over sampling of the
ethnic minorities, our survey data provide a big number of interviews for non British respon-
27The acronym IDACI stand for Income Deprivation A®ecting Children Index and it represents the propor-
tion of children aged 0-15 living in deprived households. the index is constructed on the basis of the number of
children living in household receiving income support, income-based JSA households, pension Credit (Guar-
antee) households, Working tax Credit households where they are children receiving Child Tax Credit and
whose equivalized income (excluding housing bene¯ts ad before housing costs) is below 60% of the median of
the population , child Tax Credit households not eligible for the schemes above whose equivalized income (ex-
cluding housing bene¯ts and before housing costs) is below 60% of the median of the population, households
composed by asylum seekers in England in receipt of subsistence support, accommodation support or both
28PLASC is part of the National Pupil Database (NPD)
29The calculation of the indices at district levels required the LSOA Level population at risk estimates
available under request for each LSOA in the UK. See the data appendix for a detailed description.23
dents, which permits to carry out reliable analysis also for subgroups that can not usually be
analyzed separately. In order to avoid using an excessive number of ethnic dummies, we have
aggregated the di®erent ethnicities into the nine groups we have already presented earlier in
the paper. Table 4 shows the ethnic composition of young people in the full sample. We can
notice that more than 15 per cent of the LSYPE respondents de¯ne themselves as not British
with Indian, Caribbean and Pakistani together representing half of the foreign population.
A look at the patterns of participation of di®erent ethnic groups in table 2 provides
some interesting insights. In general, Pakistani and Bangladeshi tend to participate less than
their peers belonging to di®erent ethnic groups. On the contrary, the participation rate of
Caribbean and Black people, especially in civic activities, turns out to be quite high. On
the side of spontaneous participation, British and Caribbean young people are the ones who
hang around the most. However, even if ethnicity seems to be a driving force in explaining
social participation, these data alone are not able to shed light on the mechanisms driving
involvement in social activities.
As further controls at the individual level we use a dummy variable indicating whether the
respondent was born in 1989 and another one indicating whether her main language at home
is not English. With the ¯rst variable we want to capture any e®ect due to age, together with
any other force a®ecting in a di®erent way people who were born in a di®erent calendar year,
irrespective of the cohort they belong to when they enrol into school.30 We are interested
in the main language spoken by the respondents because we want to distinguish the role of
constraints from the role of preferences. We expect that people whose main language is not
English face linguistic barriers, which makes it di±cult for them to interact with English
speakers. We can think this linguistic constraint is not very binding for a large set of the
population, since just the 2-3 per cent of the young people interviewed declared that at home
they are used to speak a language di®erent from English. Finally, we controlled for gender.
Moreover, we construct a variable which takes the value one if the school the young
person attends provides any club or sport group. This variable is intended to provide some
information about the supply side of participation opportunities with respect to sport. It
may be that poor people do not take part in sports because they can not rely on adequate
facilities, rather than because they are unwilling to be involved. If this supposition is true, the
presence or absence of sport facilities in the school should be signi¯cant for the participation
in `sports and amusements'. By looking at the percentage of young people whose schools
do not provide sport facilities (less than 8 per cent of the population), we can imagine that
the main reason why some young people decide not to play sport is not due to the supply
side. One might argue that such a variable could be endogenous, since parents who want
their children to participate in sports are likely to choose schools with good sport facilities.
LSYPE contains information on the reasons why the respondents' family chose the school
the child attends and none of the respondents indicated the presence of sport facilities as a
main reason for the children to enrol in a particular school, so we can discount the possibility
of this variable being endogenous.
30All the respondents in the LSYPE sample belong to the same cohort and they are mainly born in 1989 or
1990. There is a small group of people who were born before or after these dates, but they have been excluded
from the sample24
The last group of variables we use gives interesting information on respondents' parental
background which is also useful to control for selection into districts. The ¯rst variable
indicates whether the young people usually eat with their family and it takes the value of 1
if the respondent has never eaten with his family in the week before the interview. We are
not trying to claim the existence of any causal relationship between having dinner at home
and participating in social activities, however, the variable can be seen as a proxy for the
importance of family ties as claimed by Putnam (2000).31 Finally, at the family level control
for age and education of the main parent32 and for a variable indicating which quintile of the
distribution of the household income the respondent's family belongs to.
4.3 The Econometric model
In order to understand the e®ect of the ethnic composition of the neighborhood on each form
of social participation we have just presented (`sports and amusements', `civic activities' and
`hanging around near home'), we estimate the model by using a multivariate probit.33 The
choices of taking part in the three groups of activities are treated as interdependent but not
mutually exclusive. At a minimum, interdependency is likely to exist between an individual's
choices because of time constraints, while the reason for non-mutually-exclusiveness is that,
while the di®erent activities are substitutes in each point in time, they are compatible over
the time span considered in the survey question.
The multivariate probit is a multiple-equations extension of the univariate probit allowing
for non zero correlation among the error terms. The model is estimated through simulated
maximum likelihood using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator (see Cappellari
and Jenkins, 2003) and with standard errors clustered at the district level.
Let the latent variables y¤
1ij, y¤
2ij and y¤
3ij be, respectively, the propensity of taking part in
`sports and amusements', in `civic activities' or in `hanging around near home' for respondent
i in district j. By using the latent continuous variable speci¯cation for probit models, the
multivariate probit can be written as follows:
y¤
1ij = ®1ij + fractj¯1 + segrj¯2 + idacij°1 + x0
1ij±1 + x0
2ij´1 + ²1ij (49)
y¤
2ij = ®2ij + fractj¯3 + segrj¯4 + idacij°2 + x0
1ij±2 + x0
2ij´2 + ²2ij (50)
y¤
3ij = ®3ij + fractj¯5 + segrj¯6 + idacij°3 + x0
1ij±3 + x0
2ij´3 + ²3ij (51)
with
31Putnam (2000) observes that having a meal together is a `traditionally important form of social connect-
edness' and he uses the frequency of family dinners to describe the variation over time of the strength of family
ties
32We have included a variable indicating that the main parent has no quali¯cation
33We have also estimated the model linearly by using seemingly unrelated models as in Zellner (1962), and
the results are substantially the same as those obtained through multivariate probit (see appendix)25
y1ij = 1 if y¤
1ij > 0 (52)
y2ij = 1 if y¤
2ij > 0 (53)
y3ij = 1 if y¤
3ij > 0 (54)
Where fract is the index measuring fractionalization, segr is the Duncan and Duncan
index of segregation, idaci is the idaci index, while x1ij and x2ij are the controls at family
and at the individual level. The coe±cients ¯1, ¯2, ¯3, ¯4, ¯5, ¯6 are the parameters of
interest.
It is assumed that ²1;²2;²3 are error terms distributed as a multivariate normal with mean
of zero and variance-covariance matrix V with V=1 on the leading diagonal and correlations
½ij = ½ji. If the o®-diagonal correlations are equal to zero, the model is equivalent to a set of
unrelated probit models, so, even if the hypothesis of interdependency was not correct, the
estimates would not be a®ected.
4.4 Results
Let us start with a setting in which the option `stay at home' is not feasible i.e. the one
described in paragraphs 3.1-3.3. Our main interest is analyzing how the ethnic composition
of the district, in both its aspects of segregation and fractionalization, a®ects social participa-
tion. Testable prediction 1 predicts that the coe±cient for segregation in a model including
also a measure of fractionalization can not be negative in the case of less structured forms of
social interaction.
Table 6 presents the set of results obtained on the sub sample of those involved in at least
one form of participation, which captures the idea that staying at home is not a valid option
at this stage. In the simplest speci¯cation we included only the indices describing the ethnic
composition of the neighborhood. In a slightly more complete model we added the IDACI
index at district level to control for unobserved characteristics of the neighborhood and in
the full model we added all the controls at the individual and family level we presented in
the previous paragraphs.
It is easy to check that the prediction of the model is con¯rmed by our empirical analysis,
given that the coe±cient for segregation in the case of the variable describing spontaneous
hanging around with friends in the neighborhood is positive and highly signi¯cant. Moreover,
the result is robust to di®erent speci¯cations of the model and it becomes even stronger when
new controls are added. The rational behind it is that any increase in segregation which
leaves fractionalization una®ected is necessarily a result of a redistribution of the ethnic
groups within the district which increases the homogeneity within wards. It is worth noticing
that the predictions we can derive from the model for SA are exactly the opposite as those
for HA, which implies that segregation should have a non positive coe±cient in the case of
more structured activities, which is what we observe in the data.
Testable prediction 2 predicts that, ceteris paribus, an increase of fractionalization has a26
greater (negative) e®ect on HA than on SA. As a consequence, we expect to get a negative and
signi¯cant coe±cient for fractionalization for the case of spontaneous interaction in the ward
and a much more shaded result for more organized forms of social participation. Again, this
is con¯rmed by our regression in table 6 in which the coe±cient for ethnic fractionalization in
the case of less structured activities is negative and highly signi¯cant, while it is insigni¯cant
in all the other cases.34 The negative e®ect of fractionalization in the case of the simple
hanging around with friends in the ward can be seen as a complement of the e®ect we found
for segregation. In fact, in fragmented communities people can not rely on spontaneous forms
of interaction because the probability of meeting someone of the same ethnic group simply by
`hanging around' is low, however, in segregated communities, due to the clustering of ethnic
groups, British children can be more con¯dent that in wandering around their neighborhood
they will meet peers having a similar ethnic background.
The signs of the ethnic dummies deserve further comments. In fact, among those who take
part in at least one form of social participation, British young people seem to be more likely
to hang around with friends in the ward, while young people belonging to ethnic minorities
seem to get more involved in more structured forms of participation. This can be due both
to ethnic related preferences and to a mechanism close to the one we used in our theoretical
model claiming that, by taking part in more structured social activities, people can engage
in a within district process of search, allowing them to join sub groups where they are not
the minority. On the contrary, in the ward ethnic minorities are usually the minority, which
stops them to choose the simple hanging around.
Both our theoretical model and the results we have just discussed suggest that there is
a form of substitutability between structured and less structured forms of participation, at
least for those who take part in some forms of socialization. Table 8 (panel above) reports
the signs of the estimated correlations between the three groups of activities. It is easy
to notice that the results are in line with our classi¯cation of forms of social participation,
given that the correlation between sports and amusements and civic activities is positive,
thus con¯rming the idea that they all belong to the broader group we de¯ned as the group
of the `more purposeful' activities. Similarly, the simple hanging around has negative and
signi¯cant correlation with any other activity and this, again, is a result con¯rming our initial
hypothesis. All the correlations we have just discussed are signi¯cant at 1 percent level of
signi¯cance. Incidentally let us point out that all the correlations are found to be signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero, which suggests that there is interdependence among equations which gives
some evidence in favor of the use of the multivariate probit.
Let us now extend the analysis to the full sample by including also those young people who
are not involved in any activity. in the light of our theoretical framework, this is equivalent
of making the option `staying at home' feasible. Recall that introducing the action `staying
at home' leads to the equilibria (31), (32), (33), (34), which are similar to the equilibria
(9), (10), (11), (12) where `N' crowds out SA. In testable prediction 3 we argue that this is
particularly true for the case of ethnic minorities.
34It is worth noticing that this lack of signi¯cance is mostly due to low estimates of the coe±cients rather
than to high values of the standard errors, showing that the di®erence in the signi¯cance level is not due to
the di®erent number of activities used to construct our alternative forms of social participation27
The main di®erence between table 6 and table 7 is probably the behavior of the ethnic
dummies in the case of more structured social activities. Our results show that, when we
run the regression on the full sample, the dummies for ethnic minorities for social activities
becomes less positive and signi¯cant (and in some cases they turn also out to be negative)
which means that the group of non British is split in two parts one of those plays SA, while
the other plays N as predicted by our model. In fact, for those having a high ° or low U
staying at home is not an option and those who are not involved in HA (namely the non
British) choose to take part in a more structured social activity. The fact that the action
`staying at home' crowds out participation in more structured social activities, while it does
not a®ect spontaneous participation has an interesting policy implication. Making structured
social activities more attractive can be seen in the light of our model as an exogenous shifting
in ° and U making ° to rise and U to decrease. This means that investing in sports or in
youth groups could increase social participation for young people without having any negative
e®ect on spontaneous aggregation.
The models in tables 7 and 8 are also useful to discuss and test some of the explana-
tions for social participation suggested in the early sociological literature on the topic. For
example, the negative and signi¯cant coe±cient for segregation on civic activities is in line
with the compensation hypothesis suggested by Myrdal, Steiner, and Rose (1944) and it can
be explained by observing that, where segregation is low, ethnic minorities are more dis-
persed in the territory and they react to such a situation by opting for an Hirshmann's type
(Hirschmann, 1970) voice mechanism. Another possible explanation is that there is a sort of
substitution between the strength of ties felt within a young person's familiar-peer group and
the consciousness of belonging to the society as a whole. Therefore, in segregated societies
people prefer the interaction within their own ethnic group and such behavior `crowds out'
more broadly based activities. When we look at the pattern of participation in civic activi-
ties, we obtain results con¯rming both other empirical evidence available for the UK and the
literature on social participation in the USA. In fact, our regressions show that, while Indians
are less likely to join youth groups or to participate in civic activities, black Africans and
black Caribbeans are more likely than British young people to take part in such activities,
even when we do not consider church attendance.
In general, the complexity of the ethnic e®ects we found con¯rms the need of analyzing
separately di®erent ethnic groups and di®erent forms of social participation.
Let us look at the behavior of the IDACI Index both in the model with neighborhood
level variables and in the full model. In the model in column (2) the variable has the expected
coe±cients, given that it is negative and signi¯cant for the case of sports and amusements,
positive and signi¯cant in the case of the spontaneous aggregation and not signi¯cant (al-
though positive) in the case of civic activities. The explanation for the ¯rst result can be that
being involved in activities belonging to the ¯rst group requires paying a ticket or a fee, while
the other activities are mainly for free. In this light, the coe±cient for hanging around can be
read as the other side of the coin, given that in deprived areas the only possible opportunity
of socialization is likely to be the simple hanging around in the street. The lack of signi¯cance
for the coe±cient for deprivation in the case of civic activities re°ects a complex mechanism,28
given that on the one hand deprivation can be associated with lack of education and political
awareness, while, on the other hand, it can lead to an an Hirshmann's type voice mechanism
leading to participation in community oriented activities.35
It is interesting to notice that when we control for personal and family level characteristics
the signi¯cance of the coe±cients computed for the IDACI index disappears, while other
variables turn out to be signi¯cant. In particular, young people raised in wealthier families
with older and more educated parents are more likely to get involved in sports and amusement
while the opposite is true for the spontaneous aggregation. We think that the behavior of
the IDACI index in model (2) picks up average characteristics of those living in a speci¯c
area rather than characteristics of the area itself, which explains why the e®ects found in
model (2) disappear when more controls are added. This does not happen to our indices of
ethnic composition since their coe±cients in the cases we are interested in become even more
signi¯cant in the full model.
The behavior of the variable proxying for the importance of familiar ties gives other
interesting pieces of information. The coe±cient of the variable is positive and signi¯cant for
the generic `hanging around' variable, while it is negative in the remaining cases (although
not signi¯cant for civic activities). Although the e®ect of the variable can not be considered
a causal e®ect, the coe±cient seems to capture a form of heterogeneity between families,
showing that the more cohesive families are also those that encourage social participation in
more structured activities.
The variable indicating that English is not the main language for the respondent is neg-
ative and statistically signi¯cant for every form of social participation, although we control
for ethnic background. Moreover, its e®ect has comparable size for the three forms of social-
ization. This can be interpreted as the part of the behavior of ethnic minorities explained
by constraints rather than by preferences. This seems to suggest that the ethnic minorities
have a lower degree of social interaction, not only because of their di®erent system of values,
but also because they face linguistic constraints. However, such a conclusion must be drawn
with great caution since not having English as one's mother tongue may also be due to an
unobserved heterogeneity which makes the group under study to di®er from other migrant
belonging to the same ethnic background. In fact, it is not easy to decide whether speaking a
language other than English at home causes a lack of social interaction or it is a consequence
of a lower propensity of interacting with the English environment. Unfortunately, we are not
able to completely distinguish between the two e®ects.
Unsurprisingly, the value of coe±cient for the variable proxying for the presence of sport
facilities at school is higher and more signi¯cant for the model studying participation in the
¯rst group of activities which includes sports. It suggests that, ceteris paribus, the presence
of many organized activities near home might increase the level of participation of young
people. This, again, con¯rms that the observed pattern in social participation is the result of
both the demand and the supply side. However, it is interesting to notice that being able to
join a sports group does not crowd out participation in other types of activities which means
that demand and preferences do play an important role in people's choices. Finally, slightly
35Hirschmann (1970)29
older respondents are a little bit more likely to be involved in spontaneous socialization and
males tend to participate more than females, especially when sports and amusements are
considered.
Our ¯nal comments relate to the correlations between pairs of equations estimated on the
full sample and shown in table 8. Now we do not have any negative correlation, which is in
line with the idea that people having a higher propensity to stay at home do not take part
in any activity, regardless of whether they are spontaneous or more structured.36 However,
the strongest correlation seems to be the one between the two activities we grouped in the
SA group and this, once again, con¯rms our link between the theoretical model we propose
and the LSYPE data.
4.5 Tackling the endogeneity problem
One of the main problems in the literature on neighborhood e®ects is that the identi¯cation
of causal relationships with respect to neighborhood characteristics can be problematic. In
fact, if people endogenously select into areas on the basis of some unobserved characteristics
(Tiebout, 1956; Dustmann and Preston, 2001), it becomes di±cult distinguishing between the
e®ect of the neighborhood as a whole and the sum of the individual e®ects of its inhabitants.
In order to address this problem, we adopt di®erent strategies. First of all we use census
data for 2001 i.e. three years before the interview. On the one hand such a choice permits
to overcome the problem of a simultaneous determination of the ethnic composition of the
neighborhood and the choices of social participation of young people, on the other hand the
distance in time is not huge, thus permitting to capture the characteristics of the cultural
environment where the young people have been leaving and where social norms are formed.
Moreover, the indices for the ethnic composition of the neighborhood are constructed at
district level, in order to avoid the sources of endogeneity due to Tiebout type sorting within
districts (see Card and Rothstein, 2007). Finally, the endogeneity problem is mitigated by the
fact that young people are less mobile than adults (see Cutler and Gleaser, 1997) and they are
not directly involved in parental location decisions, therefore the choice of the neighborhood
in which the young people live is not directly correlated with their taste for social cohesion
and it depends mainly on parental characteristics we can control for.
Instrumental variables analysis All the strategies mentioned above could not be enough
to fully address the potential problem of endogenous sorting. As a consequence, we perform
an instrumental variables analysis using di®erent sets of instruments. In line with La Ferrara
and Mele (2007), we ¯rst take the fractionalization index as exogenous and we focus only on
the index of ethnic segregation, which we think is more at risk of being endogenous. The main
reason for this choice is that, while in the case of the fractionalization index constructing a
district level indicator can fully solve the problem of endogenous selection within district, in
the case of the segregation index at district level this is not possible, given that the distribution
of ethnic groups within the local authority does play a role in the de¯nition of the index. As
a consequence, the degree of internal cohesion of each ethnic group within the district could
36This is in line with what observed by Platt (2007)30
in°uence both segregation and social participation. However, in a second step we suggest an
instrument also for fractionalization and we argue that the two aspects of ethnic diversity we
focus on are the results of partially di®erent historical processes.
Instrumenting ethnic segregation In order to instrument the index of segregation we
use historical data. As we have already mentioned, the data we use to construct our indices
of ethnic composition were collected in 2001, three years before LSYPE data, such a distance
in time could not be enough to avoid endogeneity, therefore we decided to go back in time
and study the historical determinants of ethnic diversity in the UK. We claim that the forces
which drove ethnic migration in the past are correlated with social participation in 2004 only
through the actual ethnic composition.
Our identi¯cation strategy for the case of segregation is based on a well known stylized
fact in the UK, i.e. that the most racially segregated cities coincide with the so called
mill towns:37 a de¯nition which groups together a number of towns which used to lead the
industrial revolution due to their importance in the textile (mainly cotton) industry. The
reason for the correlation between the textile industry and ethnic segregation is that the mill
towns experienced a huge °ows of migrants (mainly Pakistani) which never mixed with the
English majority. Such a pattern of migration into clusters continued also after the Second
World War, when workers from both the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent moved to
the area attracted by an excess of demand of workers due to labour shortage.
In line with this idea, we selected a group of cities listed as mill towns in 1830,38 then we
computed the geodetic distance (i.e. the shortest path along the earth at sea level between
each district in England and these new reference points) according to the formula:39
distab = arccos(sin(lat(a)) ¤ sin(lat(b)) + cos(lat(a)) (55)
¤cos(lat(b)) ¤ cos(j (long(b) ¡ long(a)) j)) ¤ 6371
where a and b are the two points considered, lat(a), lat(b), long(a) and long(b) are the
latitude and the longitude in radians of each point and the number 6371 is the radius of the
earth in kilometers.







j : distij = min(distij)8j (57)
37Violent racially driven riots took place former mill towns like Oldham, Bradford, Leeds and Burney in
2001 which con¯rms that ethnic segregation keeps on having consequences nowadays
38As a robustness check we performed the same exercise by using a more comprehensive list of mill towns
encompassing a longer time span and the results do not change substantially. The results of these regressions
are available under request.
39In our formula we assume the earth is a regular sphere, which is a commonly used approximation
40We used two reference points in order to account for geographical clustering31
and
k : distik = min(distij)8j 6= j (58)
The ¯rst column of table 9 shows the results of the ¯rst stage when fractionalization is
taken as exogenous. As suggested by Angrist and Krueger (2001), the ¯rst stage regressions
are simple OLS models41 where all the covariates are averaged at district level like in Alesina
and La Ferrara (2000). As expected, the distance from the mill towns is negatively correlated
with segregation and this con¯rms the causal link we use for our identi¯cation strategy.
Moreover, the F test on the excluded instruments satis¯es both the Staiger and Stock (1997)
and the Stock and Yogo (2005) thresholds, thus giving some evidence against the insurgence
of the week instrument problem.
Being our model non linear, in the second stage we use a control function approach includ-
ing the residuals of the reduced-form equation for segregation as an additional explanatory
variable.42 The results of our second stages are shown in tables 10, 11, 12. Accounting for
endogenous segregation makes the results for the coe±cients for ethnic composition stronger
than the ones we got in our previous models. A reason for that could be that some of the
more segregated districts are located in quite big cities having a more complex social struc-
ture, better chances of taking part in political activities and smaller emphasis on spontaneous
aggregation. This could hide some of the e®ects of segregation on our di®erent forms of social
participation. Another reason why we get stronger results after performing the IV analysis
could be due to the well know `attenuation bias' which can arise as a consequence of the way
in which the data are aggregated into our indices (see Card and Rothstein, 2007). Using
predictions based on the structural determinants of segregation, but unrelated to the way in
which this is measured, can eliminate this further source of endogeneity.
41We had also run beta models and fractional models like in Papke and Wooldridge (1996), but the results
were similar in terms of sign and signi¯cance of the coe±cients to those obtained with the OLS. These results
are available under request.
42Following Angrist and Krueger (2001) have also estimated linear second stages (SUR models) where the
potentially endogenous variables are substituted by their ¯tted counterparts computed in the ¯rst stage. The
results are reported in the appendix and they are substantially the same as the ones we obtained through the
control function approach32
Instrumenting ethnic fractionalization One might argue that not only segregation but
also fractionalization could be endogenous. On a more interesting note, it can be claimed
that aggregated instruments could pick up a source of heterogeneity which is not necessarily
related to the causal mechanism we are trying to isolate. Furthermore, there could be an
additional problem in using both the index of fractionalization and the index of segregation
and it arises when the two indices are just two di®erent measures of the same phenomenon,
which leads to multicollinearity as well as to di±culties in the interpretation of the coe±cients.
In the next paragraph we suggest a possible instrument for ethnic fractionalization and, at
the same time, we show that the two aspects of ethnic diversity we use are actually driven
by di®erent historical processes.
In order to instrument fractionalization, we compute the distance of each district with the
main British ports of entry in the ¯rst half of the 20th century and we take the mean distance
from the two nearest reference points as stated in (56), (57) and (58). There are two reasons
why our reference points can be considered exogenous. First of all the position of the ports
is quite exogenously determined, given that it depends strongly on the morphology of the
land. Second, we selected the list of the places of entry into the UK according to a historical
document i.e. the Aliens Act (1905-1919) in which entry was restricted through a number of
approved ports, namely: Cardi®, Dover, Folkestone, Grangemouth, Grimsby, Harwich, Hull,
Leith, Liverpool, London, Newhaven, Southampton, the Tyne Ports and Plymouth.43
A methodology similar to ours is also used in Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the USA, but
it di®ers from the strategy used here because Britain is an island and it is probably easier
de¯ning speci¯c ports of entry, given that we do not have to deal with political boundaries
such as the the Mexican and the Canadian frontier for the United States. Moreover, our
approach is original because it selects the reference points on the basis of a historical analysis
and on a speci¯c legislative act.
One might argue that historical information might be only weakly correlated with the
actual ethnic composition. There are some historical reasons why this may be not the case.
The ¯rst reason is that the composition of the ethnic minority population has not changed
much. Holmes (2001) observes that even before the First World War the groups we consider
were the biggest non European ethnic minority groups composing the mosaic of the British
society, with the Chinese community being the smallest in size, in line with our recent data.
The second reason is related to the history of migration in Britain. The British immigration
law in place in the 19th century permitted unrestricted entry of migrants into Britain. How-
ever, starting from the 1905 Aliens Act and throughout the whole century, more and more
restrictions were posed. We think the British legislative activity with respect to migration
can be divided into two phases: an early phase based on restrictions related to ports of entry
and a later phase based on restrictions through vouchers and quota system. From 1905 to
1919 it was possible to enter the country just through a restricted number of ports. Evidence
shows that until the mid 1940s ethnic minorities were con¯ned to London, the ports and
some university towns (see Holmes, 2001)44 After the Second World War, migrants started
43Plymouth was added later, (see Pellew, 1989)
44Little (1948) observes that in ports like Cardi® `the most bitter competition between white and coloured
seamen took place' and such a ¯ght was followed by the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order33
moving to the great conurbations, this process went hand in hand with a great diversi¯cation
in the occupational structure and a greater involvement in political life. In line with such a
trend, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 set up an entry system for Commonwealth
workers based on vouchers45 which was followed by a quota system under the 1968 Act and
by further restrictions based on evidence of partiality in 1971.
The reasons why we do not compute the distances from the large clusters formed in
the 60s are twofold. First of all it could not be enough to tackle endogeneity, given that
this second wave of migration was in°uenced by the right movements in America and by
the so called `race relations industry', both of which are likely to be correlated with social
participation. Secondly, even in this second phase, the residential choices of ethnic minorities
were still strongly in°uenced by the previous restrictions on the ports of entry. In fact, the
immigration control of the 1960s made it impossible temporary migration and forced new
migrants to join the pioneers in places where they were already settled down.46
Table 9 shows the results of the ¯rst stages where also fractionalization is taken as en-
dogenous. Although it is probably not as strong as our instrument for ethnic segregation,
the distance from the ports listed in the Aliens Act does predict well the values for the index
of fractionalization and its coe±cient has the expected negative sign. It is perhaps more
interesting to look at the pattern of signi¯cance of our instruments since it suggests that we
are isolating a causal mechanism, rather than simple heterogeneity at area level. In fact,
the distance from the mill towns is signi¯cant only for predicting ethnic segregation, while
it does not play any role in predicting ethnic fractionalization. The results for the case of
ethnic fractionalization describe a completely di®erent scenario and we observe a signi¯cant
coe±cient for the distance from the ports of entry and an insigni¯cant coe±cient for the
distance from the mill towns.
The results from the second stages (see tables 10, 11, 12) both in terms of coe±cients and
in terms of standard errors, do not di®er signi¯cantly from those we got when we assumed
fractionalization was exogenous. The e®ect of applying our instrumental variable strategy is
perhaps more subtle in the case of ethnic fractionalization and this is in line with our belief
that such an indicator, if constructed at district level, is likely to be less endogenous than
the Duncan and Duncan index at district level we used to measure ethnic segregation. This
hypothesis is also suggested by the fact that the residuals from the ¯rst stage equation for
fragmentation, when included in the second stages, are not signi¯cant.
in 1925
45Previously commonwealth workers had enjoyed at least formally unrestricted entry in the country
46See again Holmes (2001)34
5 Conclusions
This paper addresses the question of whether and how the ethnic composition of the area
where young people live a®ects their pattern of social participation. We distinguish between
spontaneous and more structured forms of participation and we argue that while the former
are likely to take place in the ward where the individuals reside, the latter have a broader
scope and they take place in the district. We show that, due to the existence of the possibility
of searching within district, it is possible to have equilibria with partial integration where the
separation between ethnic groups is not complete.
Both our theoretical model and our empirical application suggest that ethnic fraction-
alization discourages spontaneous socialization, while ethnic segregation seems to make it
easier. The results on more structured activities are more shaded and they vary a bit when
di®erent sub groups of activities are considered. However, we still ¯nd a negative e®ect of
segregation on participation in civic activities. Our empirical analysis on the determinants
of participation shows that, at least for the sub sample of those taking part in at least one
activity, the simple `hanging around' in the neighborhood is a substitute for more structured
activities, namely civic activities and `sport and amusements'. Our predictions do not change
when we control for endogenous selection into districts: after applying an instrumental vari-
able approach using historical data, the results we got are even stronger especially in the case
of ethnic segregation. Moreover, our instrumental analysis shows that ethnic segregation and
ethnic fractionalization are the result of di®erent historical processes and they measure two
separated aspects of ethnic diversity.
In conclusion, our empirical analysis shows that the ethnic composition of the neighbor-
hood, however measured, has a robust e®ect on spontaneous socialization and a much weaker
e®ect on other forms of social interactions. Such a ¯nding supports one of the main hypoth-
esis of our theoretical framework, i.e. that in the case of more structured activities, people
give less importance to the ethnicity of those they interact with. This contains also a policy
implication which, in line with Putnam (2007), argues that in order to foster ethnic cohe-
siveness a country should provide people with chances for of sharing a common aim through
di®erent opportunities of social participation.35
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Appendix 1: Description of the equilibria
Proposition A1.1: In the game with two actions and one parameter of tolerance @ a
distribution of the population that supports the following equilibria.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;SA;SA;SA)
Proof. everybody has an incentive to deviate and "hang around" in her own ward,
obtaining a payo® equal to one.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;HA;HA;HA)
Proof. everybody has an incentive to deviate and play SA, obtaining a payo® equal to
one.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;SA;SA;SA), (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;HA;SA;SA), (b1;n1;b2;n2) =
(SA;SA;HA;SA), (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;SA;SA;HA)
Proof. Since people from one ward are "hanging around", one of the two wards is
"empty", so there is an incentive to play HA there, obtaining a payo® equal to one.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;SA;HA;HA):
Proof. people living of ethnicity b living in 1 and people of ethnicity n living in 1 have
an incentive to play HA in their own ward (ward one), obtaining the maximum pay
o®.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;HA;SA;SA):
Proof. people of both ethnicities living in 2 have an incentive to play HA in their own
ward (ward two), obtaining the maximum pay o®.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;HA;HA;HA), (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;SA;HA;HA), (b1;n1;b2;n2) =
(HA;HA;SA;HA), (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (HA;HA;HA;SA)
Proof. Let us consider the equilibrium (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;HA;HA;HA): people
living in n2 have an incentive to deviate and to play SA with the players of their own
type (living in b1), obtaining the maximum payo®. The same applies to players in b2,
n1 and b1 in the other cases40
number and nature of equilibria in a game with two actions and one parameter
of tolerance Let us summarize the number and the nature of the equilibria the di®erent
cases. In addition to (9) and (10) we have:
² if b1 > b2 and n1 < n2: equilibrium (11)
² if b1 > b2 and n1 > n2: neither equilibrium (11) nor equilibrium (12) can take place
² if b1 > b2 and n1 = n2: equilibrium (11)
² if b1 < b2 and n1 < n2: neither equilibrium (11) nor equilibrium (12) can take place
² if b1 < b2 and n1 > n2: equilibrium (12)
² if b1 < b2 and n1 = n2: equilibrium (12)
² if b1 = b2 and n1 < n2: equilibrium (11)
² if b1 = b2 and n1 > n2: equilibrium (12)
² if b1 = b2 and n1 = n2: both equilibrium (11) and equilibrium (12)
number and nature of equilibria in a game with two actions an two parameters
of tolerance Let us summarize the number and the nature of the equilibria the di®erent
cases. In addition to (9) and (10) we have:
² if b1 > b2 and n1 < n2: (11) 8°i and (12) if °b1 > b1n2¡b1n1
n1(b1+n2) and °n2 > b1n2¡b2n2
b2(b1+n2)
² if b1 > b2 and n1 > n2: (11) if °b2 > b2n1¡b2n2
n2(b2+n2) and (12) if °n2 > b1n2¡b2n2
b2(b1+n2)
² if b1 > b2 and n1 = n2: (11) 8°i and (12) if °n2 > b1n2¡b2n2
b2(b1+n2)
² if b1 < b2 and n1 < n2: (11) if °n1 > b2n1¡b1n1
b1(b2+n1) and (12) if °b1 > b1n2¡b1n1
n1(b1+n2)
² if b1 < b2 and n1 > n2: (11) if °n1 > b2n1¡b1n1
b1(b2+n1) and (°b2 > b2n1¡b2n2
n2(b2+n2) and 12) 8°i
² if b1 < b2 and n1 = n2: (11) if °n1 > b2n1¡b1n1
b1(b2+n1) and (12) 8°i
² if b1 = b2 and n1 < n2: (11) 8°i and (12) if °b1 > b1n2¡b1n1
n1(b1+n2)
² if b1 = b2 and n1 > n2: (11) if °b2 > b2n1¡b2n2
n2(b2+n2) and (12) 8°i
² if b1 = b2 and n1 = n2: (11) and (11) 8°i
Proposition A1.2: In the game with three actions and two parameters of tolerance @ a
distribution of the population that supports the following equilibria.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (N;SA;SA;SA), (SA;N;SA;SA), (SA;SA;N;SA),
(SA;SA;SA;N)
Proof. everybody has an incentive to deviate and "hang around" in her own ward,
obtaining a payo® equal to one.41
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (N;HA;HA;HA), (HA;N;HA;HA), (HA;HA;N;HA),
(HA;HA;HA;N)
Proof. everybody has an incentive to deviate and play SA, obtaining a payo® equal to
one.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (SA;HA;SA;N), (SA;N;SA;HA), (HA;SA;N;SA),
(N;SA;HA;SA)
Proof. Players who play N have an incentive to play HA, since the payo® obtained by
staying at home is strictly less than one.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) = (N;HA;SA;HA), (SA;HA;N;HA),(HA;N;HA;SA),
(HA;SA;HA;N)
Proof. Players who plays N have an incentive to play SA, since the payo® obtained by
staying at home is strictly less than one.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2) =(N , N, N, HA);(N;N;HA;N), (N , HA, N, N);
(HA;N;N;N), (N;N;N;SA), (N;N;SA;N),
(N;SA;N;N), (SA;N;N;N), (N;N;N;N)
Proof. Players who plays N have an incentive to play either HA SA, since the payo®
obtained by staying at home is strictly less than one.
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;N;SA;HA), (N;N;HA;SA),(N;N;SA;SA),
(N;N;HA;HA),
Proof. Nobody in ward one is involved in social activity, so people of both ethnic groups
living in ward 1 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(SA;HA;N;N), (HA;SA;N;N),(SA;SA;N;N),
(HA;HA;S;S),
Proof. Nobody in ward two is involved in social activity, so both people of both ethnic
groups living in 2 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;HA;N;HA),
Proof. Both people of ethnic group b living in 1 and people of ethnic group b living in
1 have an incentive to play SA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;SA;N;SA),
Proof. Both people of ethnic group b living in 1 and people of ethnic group b living in
2 have an incentive to play HA42
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;HA;N;SA),
Proof. People of ethnic group b living in 2 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;SA;N;HA),
Proof. People of ethnic group b living in 1 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(HA;N;HA;N),
Proof. People of ethnic group n living in both wards 1 and 2 have an incentive to play
SA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(SA;N;SA;N),
Proof. People of ethnic group n living in both wards 1 and 2 have an incentive to play
HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(HA;N;SA;N),
Proof. People of type n living in ward 2 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(SA;N;HA;N),
Proof. People of type n living in ward 1 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;HA;HA;N), (HA;N;N;HA)
Proof. The players who play N has an incentive to play SA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;SA;SA;N), (SA;N;N;SA)
Proof. The players who play N has an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;SA;HA;N)
Proof. People of type b living in ward 1 have an incentive to play HA , while People of
type n living in ward 2 have an incentive to play SA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;HA;SA;N)
Proof. People of type b living in ward 1 have an incentive to play SA , while People of
type n living in ward 2 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(SA;N;N;HA)43
Proof. People of type n living in ward 1 have an incentive to play HA , while People of
type b living in ward 2 have an incentive to play SA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(HA;N;N;SA)
Proof. People of type n living in ward 1 has an incentive to play SA , while people of
type b living in ward 2 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(HA;HA;N;SA), (HA;HA;SA;N), (N;SA;HA;HA)
Proof. The players who stay at home have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;HH;SA;SA), (SA;SA;HA;N)
Proof. All the players who play SA have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(N;SA;SA;HA)
Proof. People of type b living in ward 1 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(HA;SA;SA;N)
Proof. People of type b living in ward 2 has an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(SA;SA;N;HA), (SA;SA;HA;N)
Proof. Players of ward 1 have an incentive to play HA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(SA;HA;N;HA)
Proof. Players who play N have an incentive to play SA
² (b1;n1;b2;n2)=(SA;N;HA;HA)
Proof. People of type b living in ward 2 have an incentive to play SA44
number and nature of equilibria in a game with three actions and two parameters
of tolerance The following list summarize the nature and the number of the possible
equilibria. In addition to (9) and (10), we have:
² if b1 > b2 and n1 < n2: (11) if Un1 ·
n1+°b2
n1+b2 and Ub2 ·
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (31) if Un1 ¸
n1+°b2
n1+b2 ;
(32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+°n2
b1+n2 ; (34) if Un2 ¸
n2+°b1
b1+n2 ;
² if b1 > b2 and n1 > n2: (31) if Un1 ¸
n1+°b2
n1+b2 ; (32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+¯n2
n2+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+¯n1
b1+n1 ;
(34) if Un2 ¸
n2+¯b2
b2+n2 ;
² if b1 > b2 and n1 = n2: (11) if Un1 ·
n1+°b2
n1+b2 and Ub2 ·
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ;(31) if Un1 ¸
n1+°b2
n1+b2 ;
(32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+°n2
b1+n2 ; (34) if Un2 ¸
n2+°b1
b1+n2 ;
² if b1 < b2 and n1 < n2: (31) if Un1 ¸
n1+¯b1
n1+b1 ; (32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+¯n1
b1+n1 ;
(34) if Un2 ¸
n2+°b1
b1+n2 ;
² if b1 < b2 and n1 > n2: (11) if Un1 ·
n1+°b2
n1+b2 and Ub2 ·
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (31) if Un1 ¸
n1+°b2
n1+b2 ;
(32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+¯n1
b1+n1 ; (34) if Un2 ¸
n2+¯b2
b2+n2 ;
² if b1 < b2 and n1 = n2: (12) if Un2 ·
n2+°b2
n2+b1 and Ub1 ·
b1+°n2
n2+b1 ;(31) if Un1 ¸
n1+¯b1
n1+b1 ;
(32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+¯n1
b1+n1 ; (34) if Un2 ¸
n2+¯b2
b2+n2 ;
² if b1 = b2 and n1 < n2: (11) f Un1 ·
n1+°b2
n1+b2 and Ub2 ·
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ;(31) if Un1 ¸
n1+°b2
n1+b2 ;
(32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+¯n1
b1+n1 ; (34) if Un2 ¸
n2+°b1
b1+n2 ;
² if b1 = b2 and n1 > n2: (12) if Un2 ·
n2+°b2
n2+b1 and Ub1 ·
b1+°n2





n1+b2 ; (32) if Ub2 ¸
b2+°n1
n1+b2 ; (33) if Ub1 ¸
b1+°n2
b1+n2 ; (34) if Un2 ¸
n2+°b1
b1+n2 ;
² if b1 = b2 and n1 = n2: (11) and (12); (31) if Un1 ¸
n1+°b2





b1+n2 ; (34) if Un2 ¸
n2+°b1
b1+n2 ;45
Appendix 2: variables de¯nition
We considered two di®erent questions about young people's participation. The question
wording is the following:
Question 1:
Here is a list of things people can do when they are not at school. Can you please tell me
which, if any, you have been to or done in the last four weeks?
² Played snooker, darts or pool
² Took part in any kind of sport
² Gone to see a football match or other sports event
² Gone to an amusement arcade
² Gone to a party, dance, nightclub or disco
² Gone to a pub or bar
² Gone to a cinema, theatre or concert
² Played a musical instrument
² All of these
² None of these
Question 2:
Here is a list of some more things people do when they are not at school. Can you please
tell me which, if any, you have been to or done in the last four weeks? Just read out the
numbers.
² Gone to a political meeting/march, rally or demonstration
² Done community work (such as helping elderly, disabled or other dependent people;
cleaning up the environment; helping volunteer organizations or charities)
² Gone to a youth club or something like it (including scouts or girl guides)
² Just hubv ng around/messed about near to your home
² Just hung around/messed about in the high street or the town/city centre
² All of these
² None of these
Question 3: `How many times had taken part in religious classes in last 7 days?'
² more than once a week
² about once a week,46
² two or three times a month,
² about once a month
² less than once a month.
Question 4:
`How many times had friend round the house in last 7 days?' The possible outcomes are:
² None
² Once or twice
² 3-5 times
² More than 6 times
Question 5:
How many times gone out with friends in last 7 days?
The possible outcomes are, as before:
² None
² Once or twice
² 3-5 times
² More than 6 times47
Appendix 3: Geography and data
The Longitudinal studies of Young People in England contains a variable indicating the
output area (OA) where each respondent lives and this permits to link each observation with
a huge number of variables describing the neighborhood characteristics measured at di®erent
levels of aggregation.
English geographical hierarchy In order to understand the structure of our data, is
worth giving some basic information on the English geographical hierarchy. The lowest
available level of aggregation is the output area (OA) containing around 150 households which
are quite homogeneous in terms of characteristics of the dwelling. The OA are aggregated into
LSOAs (Lower Super Output Areas containing around 600 households), then into MSOAs
(Middle Super Output Areas containing around 2500 households). The complete structure
would include also Upper Super Output Areas (USOAs), which are not available yet.
OA are nested into wards. in England there are almost 8000 wards with an average
population of around 5500 individuals, they are used for the election of local government
councillors and they are nested into Local Authority districts (LA), which are composed, on
average, by 23 electoral wards. The districts can be of four di®erent types: metropolitan
districts (36), non-metropolitan districts (239), London Boroughs (3247 plus the city of Lon-
don) and unitary authorities (46). Among those, the ¯rst three groups have been created
as the lower level of two-tier authorities, being higher level authorities in the two-tier struc-
ture known as metropolitan and non metropolitan counties in case of metropolitan and non
metropolitan districts, while London boroughs are part of Greater London. On the contrary,
the unitary authorities are single-tier authorities and they do not belong to any county. Fi-
nally, both types of local authorities are grouped into 9 Government O±ce Regions (GORs48),
corresponding to level 1 of the `Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics' (NUTS).
An alternative geography used in England is the postal geography. The UK is divided into
many postcode units (about 1,78 million), which are grouped in more than 10000 postcode
sectors, then into around 3000 postcode districts and ¯nally into around one hundred postcode
areas. The postcodes do not have any geographical meaning and they are simply groups of
up to 100 adjacent addresses used for organizing the delivery of the mails. For this reason,
we chose to limit our use of the postal geography just to the computation of the distances
between cities we used for our instrumental variables. Using the postal geography to derive
locational attributes is a common practice and it is due to the fact that the O±ce of National
Statistics assigns centroids to postcodes thus making it possible to compute distances among
between each couple of units in the country. The postal geography and the geography used
in the census are not exactly compatible, but at our level of aggregation they can be jointly
used with limited loss of precision by using the look up tables provided by the ONS.
47City of London, Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Bexley, Brent, Bromley, Camden, Croydon, Ealing, En-
¯eld, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Haringey, Harrow, Havering, Hillingdon, Hounslow, Is-
lington, Kensington and Chelsea, Kingston upon Thames, Lambeth, Lewisham, Merton, Newham, Redbridge,
Richmond upon Thames, Southwark, Sutton, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, Westminster.
48North East, North West, Yorkshire and The Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England,
London, South East, South West48
data Sources For our analysis we used data taken from di®erent data sources we merged
into the main LSYPE dataset. The indices of ethnic composition are derived the 2001 census
for England. Census data permit to compute the exact number of people for each ethnic
group living in each ward in 2001. Moreover, we have linked the LSYPE records to the
relevant `index of deprivation a®ecting children' available through the Pupil Level Annual
School Census (PLASC) dataset for 2004. As we have already mentioned, the IDACI index
is released at LSOA level so that the ¯gure for the districts must be computed as a weighted
average of the single records for al the LSOA in the district. Setting up the system of
weights requires the SOA Level population at risk estimates which can be obtained from
the `Department for Communities and Local Government'. This permits to compute at the
district level both the number of children actually used to compute the IDACI index and the
number of those at risk of being deprived (the denominators in the calculus of the index).
Once computed the indices at district level, they have been added to the main data.49
Appendix 4: Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the selected sample
variable obs mean st.dev min max
sports amusements 9772 0.852 0.08 0 1
political social 9772 0.247 0.086 0 1
hang about 9772 0.548 0.122 0 1
fractionalization 308 0.152 0.147 0.02 0.676
segregation 308 0.197 0.108 0.058 0.619
idaci 308 0.185 0.091 0.052 0.585
age main parent 9772 41.63 5.982 20 72
no quali¯cation 9772 0.176 0.381 0 1
no dinner 9772 0.089 0.284 0 1
no mother tongue 9772 0.023 0.152 0 1
clubs 9772 0.934 0.246 0 1
male 9772 0.505 0.499 0 1
born in the 1989 9772 0.322 0.467 0 1
income 9772 23378.38 11979.74 0 40000
other white 9772 0.016 0.127 0 1
indian 9772 0.029 0.169 0 1
caribbean 9772 0.028 0.165 0 1
mixed 9772 0.016 0.126 0 1
african 9772 0.018 0.136 0 1
pakistani 9772 0.016 0.126 0 1
bangladeshi 9772 0.006 0.081 0 1
chinese 9772 0.003 0.055 0 1
Table 2: Participation in social activities (%)
Ethnic group Sports and amusements Civic activities Spontaneous
participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Other white and Irish 27.82 66.36 21.11 27.05 58.09 1.59 4.95 16.27 45.51 31.41
Caribbean 18.47 53.25 17.11 36.38 53.00 1.38 3.74 29.32 52.13 28.97
African 15.88 49.69 13.14 24.16 48.23 1.16 3.52 24.12 34.59 19.08
Pakistani 25.36 56.32 10.64 7.85 33.36 2.02 2.58 14.24 30.71 12.97
Bangladeshi 18.89 37.92 11.29 9.81 29.75 1.75 3.20 17.86 31.89 14.25
Indian 24.01 52.19 10.99 17.26 52.13 1.71 3.12 13.11 32.93 20.09
Chinese 17.10 53.09 3.35 17.82 47.64 0 0 16.44 34.88 23.45
British 27.20 50.70 20.63 28.74 49.36 1.23 4.5 20.76 58.47 30.92
other 20.19 60.14 17.17 20.55 53.40 2.19 3.53 14.99 38.03 23.27
mean 26.33 57.85 19.62 27.60 49.25 1.29 4.32 20.43 55.33 29.5450
Table 3: Segregation and fractionalization in English districts
District Region Index
Least segregated districts dissimilarity index
Castle Point East Anglia 0.0584
Ash¯eld East Midlands 0.064
Sedgemoor South West 0.0696
Basildon East Anglia 0.0697
Hertsmere East Anglia 0.0701
Most segregated districts
Burnley rest of north west 0.5207
Bradford West Yorkshire 0.5242
Pendle rest of north west 0.5531
Oldham Greater Manchester 0.5777
Blackburn with Darwen rest of north west 0.6198
Least fragmented districts fractionalization index
Easington Rest of North 0.0202
Sedge¯eld Rest of North 0.0237
Derwentside Rest of North 0.024
Wear Valley Rest of North 0.0261
Alnwick Rest of North 0.0275
Most fragmented districts
Lambeth Inner London 0.6548
Tower Hamlets Inner London 0.6586
Haringey Inner London 0.6662
Newham Inner London 0.6714
Hackney Inner London 0.6761
Table 4: Composition of the sample and the population
Ethnicity number Percentage in the sample Percentage in the population
Other white and Irish 232 1.51 1.86
Caribbean 1061 6.88 2.87
African 704 4.57 1.97
Pakistani 940 6.10 2.26
Bangladeshi 722 4.68 0.90
Indian 1195 7.75 3.28
Chinese 44 0.29 0.39
British 10103 65.55 84.27
other 411 2.67 2.20
Table 5: Participation in social activities
Activity Percentage
sports and amusements









Hang around near home 55.33
excluded activities
hang around in the city centre 29.54

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Correlations between the dependent variables
sub sample
just ethnic neighborhood full
½21 0.0712 *** 0.0767 *** 0.0588 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
½31 -0.0985 *** -0.0924 *** -0.0703 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
½32 -0.0551 *** -0.0535 *** -0.0526 ***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018)
Observations 13719 13718 9292
full sample
just ethnic neighborhood full
½21 0.2045 *** 0.2130 *** 0.1741 ***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.018)
½31 0.1759 *** 0.1699 *** 0.1307 ***
(0.026) (0.014) (0.019)
½32 0.0151 0.0135 0.0033
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
Observations 14692 14691 9772
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.0154
Table 9: First stage regression (linear, means at the district level)
just segregation both indices
endogenous endogenous
segregation segregation fractionalization
dist mill towns -0.0003 *** -0.0002 *** 0.0000
dist ports 0.0002 -0.0003 **
fract 0.3940 ***
idaci 0.2912 *** 0.3420 *** 0.0775
no dinner 0.0337 0.0280 -0.0088
no mother tongue -0.1546 0.0503 0.5359 ***
no clubs 0.0463 0.0339 -0.0124
other white -0.1865 -0.0339 0.3825 ***
indian 0.3337 *** 0.4830 *** 0.4248 ***
caribbean -0.3234 ** 0.0516 0.9927 ***
mixed -0.1051 0.0033 0.2227
african -0.6125 *** -0.3610 ** 0.5440 ***
pakistani 0.6465 *** 0.8241 *** 0.4220 ***
bangladeshi -0.4416 *** -0.1869 0.6471 ***
chinese 0.7073 0.7117 -0.0348
fam controls yes yes yes
ind controls yes yes yes
Constant 0.2802 ** 0.1502 -0.2408 **
F test on the
excluded instruments 34.53 28.96 8.51
Observations 308 30855
Table 10: Second stages on the sub sample of those involved in at least one form of partici-
pation
just segregation endogenous both endogenous
sport civic hang sport civic hang
amusement activities around amusement activities around
fract -0.0657 0.1520 -0.4495 *** -0.1432 0.1910 -0.4651 ***
(0.157) (0.126) (0.133) (0.184) (0.175) (0.150)
segr 0.2177 -0.7288 *** 0.8372 *** 0.1091 -0.6474 *** 0.8534 ***
(0.290) (0.220) (0.235) (0.299) (0.250) (0.248)
Residuals segr -0.1675 0.8613 *** -0.6341 -0.0771 0.7766 ** -0.6877 *
(0.398) (0.321) (0.403) (0.424) (0.333) (0.407)
residuals fragm 0.4119 -0.5048 0.3238
(0.417) (0.382) (0.335)
idaci -0.0920 0.3542 0.0775 -0.0055 0.3031 0.0755
(0.215) (0.232) (0.240) (0.230) (0.231) (0.247)
age mp 0.0070 *** 0.0015 -0.0092 *** 0.0070 *** 0.0014 -0.0092 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
no qual -0.1599 *** -0.0635 0.0888 ** -0.1587 *** -0.0645 0.0893 **
(0.047) (0.041) (0.037) (0.047) (0.042) (0.037)
no dinner -0.1845 *** -0.0204 0.1641 *** -0.1846 *** -0.0208 0.1645 ***
(0.054) (0.057) (0.049) (0.054) (0.056) (0.048)
no mmother t -0.0788 -0.2327 *** -0.1900 *** -0.0762 -0.2342 *** -0.1890 ***
(0.095) (0.074) (0.071) (0.095) (0.074) (0.070)
no clubs 0.3900 *** 0.0283 0.0096 0.3896 *** 0.0288 0.0093
(0.074) (0.058) (0.057) (0.074) (0.058) (0.057)
gender 0.3832 *** 0.0162 0.1037 *** 0.3841 *** 0.0160 0.1037 ***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.027) (0.024)
born in 1989 0.0332 -0.0111 0.0388 0.0333 -0.0109 0.0385
(0.048) (0.032) (0.030) (0.048) (0.032) (0.030)
inc-2nd 0.1184 ** 0.0068 0.0617 0.1190 ** 0.0069 0.0618
(0.058) (0.062) (0.053) (0.058) (0.062) (0.053)
inc-3rd 0.1230 ** -0.0920 * -0.0185 0.1230 ** -0.0919 * -0.0187
(0.053) (0.053) (0.039) (0.053) (0.053) (0.039)
inc-4th 0.1742 *** -0.0063 0.0037 0.1740 *** -0.0061 0.0036
(0.056) (0.045) (0.038) (0.056) (0.045) (0.038)
inc-5th 0.3365 *** -0.0002 -0.1489 *** 0.3381 *** -0.0013 -0.1483 ***
(0.059) (0.049) (0.033) (0.059) (0.049) (0.033)
other white 0.5250 *** -0.0370 -0.2934 *** 0.5316 *** -0.0396 -0.2918 ***
(0.186) (0.127) (0.096) (0.187) (0.127) (0.096)
asian 0.1723 ** -0.1507 ** -0.5786 *** 0.1887 ** -0.1592 ** -0.5782 ***
(0.082) (0.060) (0.057) (0.083) (0.065) (0.056)
caribbean 0.0908 0.2682 *** -0.1640 ** 0.1022 0.2636 *** -0.1625 **
(0.075) (0.063) (0.071) (0.072) (0.068) (0.071)
other 0.2844 * -0.0057 -0.4039 *** 0.2927 * -0.0104 -0.4028 ***
(0.153) (0.108) (0.095) (0.155) (0.111) (0.098)
african 0.2634 ** 0.1708 ** -0.3981 *** 0.2748 *** 0.1659 * -0.3952 ***
(0.107) (0.083) (0.063) (0.106) (0.087) (0.063)
pakistani 0.2498 ** 0.1282 -0.7841 *** 0.2624 ** 0.1205 -0.7859 ***
(0.116) (0.102) (0.076) (0.113) (0.105) (0.074)
bangladeshi 0.0653 0.1648 -0.3798 *** 0.0762 0.1607 -0.3761 ***
(0.126) (0.123) (0.093) (0.127) (0.123) (0.092)
chinese -0.3215 0.3390 -0.2586 -0.3122 0.3347 -0.2586
(1.091) (0.276) (0.408) (1.087) (0.278) (0.403)
Constant 0.3096 ** -0.6461 *** 0.5174 *** 0.3218 ** -0.6568 *** 0.5156 ***
(0.151) (0.157) (0.116) (0.156) (0.159) (0.117)
Observations 9292 9292
Standard errors in par. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.0156
Table 11: Second stages on the full sample
just segregation endogenous both endogenous
sport civic hang sport civic hang
amusement activities around amusement activities around
fract -0.2704 ** 0.0861 -0.4995 *** -0.3546 ** 0.1100 -0.5277 ***
(0.133) (0.130) (0.129) (0.170) (0.168) (0.119)
segr 0.0690 -0.6974 *** 0.7725 *** -0.0449 -0.6400 *** 0.7673 ***
(0.293) (0.162) (0.240) (0.281) (0.202) (0.254)
Residuals segr -0.1235 0.8130 *** -0.6022 * -0.0296 0.7512 ** -0.6332 **
(0.452) (0.311) (0.312) (0.458) (0.340) (0.296)
residuals fragm 0.4297 -0.4211 0.3661
(0.413) (0.286) (0.315)
idaci 0.0489 0.3591 0.1080 0.1432 0.3256 0.1223
(0.245) (0.230) (0.209) (0.276) (0.233) (0.221)
age mp 0.0055 ** 0.0014 -0.0084 *** 0.0056 ** 0.0014 -0.0084 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
no qual -0.1484 *** -0.0644 0.0742 ** -0.1465 *** -0.0650 0.0749 **
(0.045) (0.043) (0.031) (0.045) (0.044) (0.032)
no dinner -0.1562 *** -0.0302 0.1495 *** -0.1568 *** -0.0305 0.1497 ***
(0.059) (0.045) (0.047) (0.058) (0.045) (0.046)
no mmother t -0.2424 *** -0.2794 *** -0.2484 *** -0.2385 *** -0.2805 *** -0.2469 ***
(0.059) (0.064) (0.066) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065)
no clubs 0.3823 *** 0.0456 0.0435 0.3809 *** 0.0461 0.0428
(0.060) (0.055) (0.047) (0.060) (0.055) (0.047)
gender 0.4561 *** 0.0536 ** 0.1503 *** 0.4563 *** 0.0536 ** 0.1502 ***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
born in 1989 0.0437 -0.0087 0.0437 0.0443 -0.0084 0.0435
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
inc-2nd 0.1099 ** 0.0155 0.0706 * 0.1104 ** 0.0154 0.0708 *
(0.049) (0.047) (0.039) (0.049) (0.047) (0.039)
inc-3rd 0.1272 ** -0.0763 0.0009 0.1271 ** -0.0763 0.0007
(0.050) (0.052) (0.041) (0.050) (0.052) (0.041)
inc-4th 0.2072 *** 0.0136 0.0352 0.2066 *** 0.0137 0.0351
(0.052) (0.041) (0.043) (0.052) (0.041) (0.043)
inc-5th 0.3749 *** 0.0270 -0.1045 *** 0.3763 *** 0.0262 -0.1038 ***
(0.057) (0.047) (0.036) (0.057) (0.047) (0.036)
other white 0.4935 *** -0.0069 -0.2531 ** 0.5019 *** -0.0083 -0.2505 **
(0.174) (0.122) (0.122) (0.174) (0.123) (0.123)
asian -0.0068 -0.1721 *** -0.5980 *** 0.0115 -0.1774 *** -0.5945 ***
(0.064) (0.062) (0.048) (0.065) (0.067) (0.048)
caribbean 0.0869 0.2679 *** -0.1503 ** 0.0988 0.2653 *** -0.1471 **
(0.077) (0.071) (0.062) (0.076) (0.076) (0.062)
other 0.1034 -0.0218 -0.4188 *** 0.1124 -0.0249 -0.4164 ***
(0.116) (0.105) (0.089) (0.116) (0.106) (0.089)
african 0.1252 0.1540 * -0.3982 *** 0.1376 * 0.1511 * -0.3936 ***
(0.079) (0.084) (0.071) (0.078) (0.087) (0.070)
pakistani -0.1993 *** 0.0281 -0.8588 *** -0.1859 *** 0.0226 -0.8582 ***
(0.065) (0.110) (0.067) (0.064) (0.112) (0.066)
bangladeshi -0.2855 *** 0.0351 -0.5049 *** -0.2755 *** 0.0328 -0.4999 ***
(0.085) (0.108) (0.098) (0.085) (0.108) (0.098)
chinese -0.4616 * 0.2418 -0.3507 -0.4535 * 0.2391 -0.3494
(0.265) (0.318) (0.274) (0.264) (0.317) (0.272)
Constant 0.2208 -0.7136 *** 0.3747 *** 0.2334 -0.7214 *** 0.3758 ***
(0.173) (0.109) (0.097) (0.174) (0.113) (0.098)
Observations 9772 9772
Standard errors in par. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.0157
Table 12: Second stages: correlations between the dependent variables
subsample
just segregation both indices
endogenous endogenous
½21 0.0526 ** 0.0526 **
(0.022) (0.022)
½31 -0.0742 *** -0.0743 ***
(0.018) (0.018)




½21 0.1865 *** 0.1865 ***
(0.020) (0.020)





Standard errors in parentheses
*p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.0158
Table 13: Results for the seemingly unrelated models
sub-sample full sample
sports civic hang sports civic hang
amusements activities about amusements activities about
fract -0.0059 0.0329 -0.1547 *** -0.0531 0.0129 -0.1713 ***
(-0.025) (-0.052) (-0.049) (-0.036) (-0.045) (-0.052)
segr 0.0197 -0.0894 * 0.188 *** 0.0034 -0.0848 ** 0.1695 ***
(-0.028) (-0.047) (-0.053) (-0.029) (-0.042) (-0.054)
idaci -0.0124 0.0695 0.0708 0.0117 0.0695 0.0802
(-0.037) (-0.071) (-0.061) (-0.054) (-0.07) (-0.07)
age main parent 0.0012 ** 0.0005 -0.0035 *** 0.0011 * 0.0005 -0.0032 ***
(-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001)
no quali¯cation -0.0302 *** -0.0198 0.0322 ** -0.0357 *** -0.0199 0.0267 **
(-0.008) (-0.012) (-0.014) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.011)
no dinner -0.0354 *** -0.0073 0.062 *** -0.0356 ** -0.0071 0.0583 ***
(-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.017) (-0.014) (-0.016) (-0.018)
no mother tongue -0.0099 -0.0718 *** -0.0723 ** -0.0688 *** -0.0788 *** -0.0906 ***
(-0.015 (-0.023) (-0.031) (-0.015) (-0.023) (-0.024)
no clubs 0.0827 *** 0.0083 0.0037 0.0997 *** 0.0144 0.0173
(-0.015 (-0.021) (-0.022) (-0.019) (-0.015) (-0.019)
gender 0.0623 *** 0.0051 0.0392 *** 0.0965 *** 0.0161 * 0.0566 ***
(-0.006 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.007) (-0.009) (-0.011)
born in 1989 0.0048 -0.0039 0.0152 0.0086 -0.0022 0.0173 **
(-0.006 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.007) (-0.01) (-0.009)
inc-2nd 0.0237 ** 0.0018 0.0229 0.0279 ** 0.0038 0.026
(-0.011 (-0.016) (-0.018) (-0.012) (-0.015) (-0.016)
inc-3rd 0.0235 ** -0.0297 ** -0.0072 0.0322 *** -0.0243 0.0004
(-0.01 (-0.015) (-0.014) (-0.012) (-0.015) (-0.016)
inc-4th 0.0316 *** -0.0019 0.0014 0.048 *** 0.0041 0.0128
(-0.011) (-0.013) (-0.016) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.018)
inc-5th 0.055 *** -0.0001 -0.0573 *** 0.077 *** 0.0076 -0.0404 **
(-0.01) (-0.016) (-0.014) (-0.011) (-0.016) (-0.017)
other white 0.0688 *** -0.0082 -0.1193 ** 0.0882 *** -0.0026 -0.1071 **
(-0.019) (-0.036) (-0.047) (-0.019) (-0.037) (-0.044)
indian 0.0264 ** -0.0506 ** -0.2195 *** -0.0012 -0.0535 *** -0.2264 ***
(-0.011) (-0.02) (-0.022) (-0.017) (-0.017) (-0.018)
caribbean 0.0149 0.0962 *** -0.064 *** 0.0183 0.0944 *** -0.0602 ***
(-0.012) (-0.026) (-0.023) (-0.016) (-0.022) (-0.022)
mixed 0.0436 ** -0.0023 -0.1587 *** 0.0213 -0.0059 -0.1626 ***
(-0.019) (-0.032) (-0.035) (-0.024) (-0.03) (-0.036)
african 0.0398 *** 0.0639 ** -0.1601 *** 0.0246 0.0558 ** -0.1628 ***
(-0.014) (-0.03) (-0.027) (-0.017) (-0.027) (-0.027)
pakistani 0.0392 *** 0.0275 -0.2893 *** -0.057 *** -0.0013 -0.3134 ***
(-0.014) (-0.032) (-0.027) (-0.02) (-0.025) (-0.025)
bangladeshi 0.0034 0.0658 -0.1557 *** -0.1001 *** 0.0239 -0.2023 ***
(-0.024) (-0.04) (-0.037) (-0.024) (-0.037) (-0.034)
chinese -0.0552 0.1094 -0.0954 -0.1145 0.0715 -0.1364
(-0.083) (-0.094) (-0.129) (-0.084) (-0.085) (-0.106)
Constant 0.7161 *** 0.2402 *** 0.7155 *** 0.6517 *** 0.2194 *** 0.6599 ***
(-0.032) (-0.042) (-0.04) (-0.042) (-0.04) (-0.039)
Observations 9292 9772
st errors in par * p < :10 ** p < :05 *** p < :01
49
49The data in tables 2, 1, 4 and 5 are weighted. In table 8 the variable 1 is `sports and amusements', the
variable 2 is `civic activities' and the variable 3 is `hanging around'. In table 9 the covariates are means at
the district level of all individual controls in tables 7 and 8. In tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 standard errors
are clustered by districts and, in tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 they are also bootstrapped to account for the
generated variable problem.59
Table 14: Results for the seemingly unrelated models: second stages: sub sample
just segregation endogenous both endogenous
sports civic hang sports civic hang
amusements activities about amusements activities about
fract -0.0077 0.0524 -0.1735 ***
(0.026) (0.048) (0.053)
fract (¯tted) -0.0204 0.0688 -0.1793 ***
(0.031) (0.051) (0.055)
segr (¯tted) 0.0330 -0.2413 *** 0.3261 *** 0.0232 -0.2243 *** 0.3271 ***
(0.045) (0.075) (0.087) (0.044) (0.068) (0.088)
idaci -0.0172 0.1235 0.0208 -0.0043 0.1041 0.0206
(0.038) (0.081) (0.088) (0.042) (0.069) (0.077)
age main parent 0.0012 ** 0.0004 -0.0035 *** 0.0012 ** 0.0004 -0.0034 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
no quali¯cation -0.0301 *** -0.0200 * 0.0329 ** -0.0301 *** -0.0198 0.0332 **
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
no dinner -0.0354 *** -0.0076 0.0624 *** -0.0354 *** -0.0076 0.0626 ***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
no mother tongue -0.0098 -0.0735 *** -0.0706 *** -0.0094 -0.0739 *** -0.0701 **
(0.016) (0.022) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028)
no clubs 0.0826 *** 0.0086 0.0030 0.0826 *** 0.0088 0.0029
(0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022)
gender 0.0623 *** 0.0051 0.0393 *** 0.0622 *** 0.0053 0.0394 ***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
born in 1989 0.0047 -0.0037 0.0146 0.0048 -0.0037 0.0145
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
inc-2nd 0.0237 * 0.0020 0.0229 0.0236 ** 0.0021 0.0230
(0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
inc-3rd 0.0236 ** -0.0295 ** -0.0071 0.0235 ** -0.0294 * -0.0071
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
inc-4th 0.0317 *** -0.0019 0.0015 0.0317 *** -0.0019 0.0014
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
inc-5th 0.0550 *** -0.0003 -0.0573 *** 0.0552 *** -0.0007 -0.0571 ***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
other white 0.0691 *** -0.0126 -0.1153 *** 0.0706 *** -0.0145 -0.1149 ***
(0.020) (0.041) (0.044) (0.018) (0.031) (0.040)
indian 0.0260 ** -0.0441 ** -0.2239 *** 0.0284 *** -0.0475 *** -0.2238 ***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.025) (0.010) (0.018) (0.024)
caribbean 0.0151 0.0945 *** -0.0617 *** 0.0175 0.0909 *** -0.0617 ***
(0.013) (0.027) (0.021) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022)
mixed 0.0435 ** -0.0022 -0.1594 *** 0.0454 ** -0.0052 -0.1592 ***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.040) (0.018) (0.033) (0.038)
african 0.0403 *** 0.0575 * -0.1548 *** 0.0428 *** 0.0540 * -0.1540 ***
(0.014) (0.031) (0.029) (0.014) (0.030) (0.028)
pakistani 0.0381 ** 0.0419 -0.3010 *** 0.0407 *** 0.0369 -0.3024 ***
(0.016) (0.031) (0.033) (0.013) (0.032) (0.030)
bangladeshi 0.0044 0.0557 -0.1459 *** 0.0064 0.0531 -0.1448 ***
(0.022) (0.038) (0.042) (0.022) (0.044) (0.043)
chinese -0.0557 0.1140 -0.1001 -0.0543 0.1119 -0.1001
(0.085) (0.104) (0.116) (0.074) (0.112) (0.125)
Constant 0.7145 *** 0.2604 *** 0.6990 *** 0.7155 *** 0.2585 *** 0.6988 ***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.032) (0.046) (0.035)
Observations 9292 9292
st errors in par * p < :10 ** p < :05 *** p < :0160
Table 15: Results for the seemingly unrelated models: second stages: full sample
just segregation endogenous both endogenous
sports civic hang sports civic hang
amusements activities about amusements activities about
fract -0.0542 0.0300 -0.1889 ***
(0.038) (0.046) (0.048)
fract (¯tted) -0.0773 * 0.0433 -0.1977 ***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.052)
segr (¯tted) 0.0128 -0.2197 *** 0.2964 *** -0.0143 -0.2081 *** 0.2894 ***
(0.067) (0.056) (0.101) (0.061) (0.073) (0.099)
idaci 0.0086 0.1153 * 0.0367 0.0334 0.0997 0.0411
(0.056) (0.059) (0.078) (0.064) (0.069) (0.082)
age main parent 0.0011 ** 0.0004 -0.0032 *** 0.0012 ** 0.0004 -0.0032 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
no quali¯cation -0.0357 *** -0.0200 0.0273 * -0.0353 *** -0.0197 * 0.0277 **
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
no dinner -0.0356 ** -0.0073 0.0585 *** -0.0357 ** -0.0072 0.0586 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
no mother tongue -0.0687 *** -0.0799 *** -0.0894 *** -0.0677 *** -0.0801 *** -0.0887 ***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026)
no clubs 0.0997 *** 0.0147 0.0165 0.0993 *** 0.0148 0.0163
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022)
gender 0.0965 *** 0.0161 * 0.0567 *** 0.0965 *** 0.0163 ** 0.0568 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
born in 1989 0.0086 -0.0019 0.0168 * 0.0086 -0.0019 0.0167 *
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
inc-2nd 0.0279 ** 0.0041 0.0257 0.0278 ** 0.0042 0.0259 *
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015)
inc-3rd 0.0321 *** -0.0239 * 0.0003 0.0321 *** -0.0238 0.0002
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
inc-4th 0.0480 *** 0.0041 0.0129 0.0479 *** 0.0041 0.0127
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
inc-5th 0.0770 *** 0.0074 -0.0405 *** 0.0773 *** 0.0071 -0.0401 ***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
other white 0.0884 *** -0.0065 -0.1034 ** 0.0906 *** -0.0082 -0.1029 **
(0.025) (0.034) (0.045) (0.021) (0.037) (0.040)
indian -0.0017 -0.0476 *** -0.2305 *** 0.0030 -0.0504 *** -0.2296 ***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
caribbean 0.0184 0.0930 *** -0.0581 ** 0.0218 0.0896 *** -0.0580 **
(0.014) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.025)
mixed 0.0213 -0.0060 -0.1626 *** 0.0238 -0.0087 -0.1623 ***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.040)
african 0.0250 0.0502 * -0.1577 *** 0.0286 0.0469 -0.1568 ***
(0.018) (0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.030) (0.026)
pakistani -0.0579 ** 0.0121 -0.3248 *** -0.0541 *** 0.0075 -0.3257 ***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.028) (0.026)
bangladeshi -0.0995 *** 0.0151 -0.1936 *** -0.0965 *** 0.0127 -0.1925 ***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.038) (0.028) (0.033) (0.038)
chinese -0.1147 0.0744 -0.1390 -0.1126 0.0725 -0.1388
(0.098) (0.086) (0.107) (0.088) (0.087) (0.102)
Constant 0.6504 *** 0.2373 *** 0.6448 *** 0.6536 *** 0.2361 *** 0.6457 ***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041)
Observations 9772 9772
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Figure 3: Ethnic diversity and spontaneous participation